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Even after landmark health reform in 2010, our health care system
will not achieve universal coverage. The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act is expected to leave twenty-three million people uninsured after a
decade. And until several major provisions take effect in 2014, fifty million
people will remain uninsured. This Article argues that cross-border health
insurance plans that utilize foreign medical providers are a surprisingly
feasible alternative for the residually uninsured. Cross-border plans can be
much less expensive than traditional, domestic-only plans. And they might
appeal to immigrants and others that are neither eligible for public plans
nor able to afford private ones.
The Article begins by evaluating the 2010 health reform legislation
and the populations that it leaves out. I then reveal how gaps in our health
care system are being filled by foreign medical providers. Three major
constituents of the U.S. health care system now utilize foreign providers:
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patients travel as "medical tourists" when they cannot afford care
domestically; insurers outsource high-margin procedures to foreign
hospitals; and somewhat perversely, some U.S. hospitals facing
extraordinary expenses repatriate immigrants to their native countries in a
form of international "patient dumping." These trends reflect what I call
the "new geography " of health care.
The Article demonstrates how cross-border plans might appeal both to
immigrants and to the nonimmigrant middle class that cannot afford
traditional insurance. I explain how cross-border plans operate and
propose various solutions to the legal and practical impediments that
presently discourage such arrangements. For example, the Article applies
"new governance" theories to recommend how to impose quality standards
on foreign providers that otherwise reside beyond the jurisdiction of
domestic regulators.
This Article also confronts an underlying normative question: How
much should we relax or reconfigure our standards to make health care
more accessible? I argue that if a significant portion of residents cannot
afford health care in the United States-and if we are not prepared to
provide it publicly as most other countries do-then we should reimagine
current laws that contemplate only domestic care and create a legal
framework that allows patients to seek it elsewhere.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2010, Congress enacted the most significant health care
legislation in nearly fifty years.' The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act ("the Affordable Care Act" or "the Act")2 is expected to expand
access to insurance greatly through an intricate and controversial series of
mandates, subsidies, tax credits, public program expansions, and insurance
market reforms. Forecasters predict that the law will lower the number of
uninsured from fifty-four million to twenty-three million over the next
decade, reducing the percentage of uninsured from nineteen to eight.3 This
1. Forty-five years prior, Congress passed the Social Security Amendments of 1965, creating
Medicare and Medicaid. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. I11-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305).
3. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, House
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undoubtedly would represent a major achievement, particularly for a health
care system that has gained international notoriety for simultaneously
spending almost twice as much as any other system while leaving over fifty
million uninsured.4 But even after health reform is fully implemented,
twenty-three million will remain uninsured, "about one-third of whom
would be unauthorized imnigrants."5 And in the more immediate future,
before several major provisions take effect in 2014, roughly fifty million
residents will remain uninsured.6 How might these populations access
health insurance?
This Article proposes a relatively novel way to make health insurance
accessible to those who remain uninsured after reform. I explain how cross-
border insurance-plans that cover domestic medical providers but also
encourage patients to visit foreign providers-is a surprisingly feasible
alternative for many patients who cannot access traditional public or
private insurance. Cross-border plans are documented to be much less
expensive than traditional plans, and may appeal to immigrants and others
who already look outside the United States for health care. To these
patients, the choice may be between cross-border insurance or none at all.
This proposal assimilates various trends that reveal the harsh realities
of our health care system. Over the past decade, foreign medical providers
have emerged as an important safety valve for three major constituents of
the U.S. health care system: patients, insurers, and hospitals. Patients are
venturing overseas as so-called "medical tourists" when they cannot afford
care domestically. Insurers are contracting with foreign hospitals to
outsource certain expensive treatments. And even U.S. hospitals providing
uncompensated care to immigrants have begun "repatriating" those who
they suspect are here unlawfully7 to hospitals and clinics abroad.' The
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 9, app. tbl.4 (Mar. 20, 2010) [hereinafter CBO letter], available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/I13xx/doc1379/AmendReconProp.pdf. These figures account for the
"nonelderly" population not eligible for Medicare.
4. See id; CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2009, at 22, 23 tbl.8 (2010); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD HEALTH AT A GLANCE
2009: OECD INDICATORS (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/health/healthataglance; WORLD
HEALTH ORG., SPENDING ON HEALTH: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW (2007), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs3I9/en/index.htm.
5. CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 9.
6. Id at app. tbl.4.
7. Because there are dozens of different immigration statuses, I use the phrase "immigrants" to
refer both to those who are lawfully present and those who are not. I use "authorized immigrants" to
refer to those who are lawfully present, pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (2006). 1 use "unauthorized immigrants" to denote immigrants who do not reside in the United
States with the express permission of the U.S. government. For a discussion of the social and legal
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federal government neither regulates nor monitors these trends. This
Article explains how we can use cross-border insurance not only to cover
some uninsured populations, but also to fill the regulatory void in which
medical tourism, outsourcing, and repatriation have emerged.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II explains who will remain
uninsured after health reform, both in the immediate and distant futures,
and discusses how these populations access care in the United States. Part
III examines how a combination of opportunism, creativity, and
desperation has led U.S. patients, insurers, and hospitals to rely on foreign
medical providers. Parts IV and V then outline precisely how cross-border
insurance can offer an alternative to those who remain uninsured after
reform, sketching out the legal mechanics and responding to commonly
cited concerns about cross-border care.
Part IV.A outlines why cross-border insurance is a feasible alternative.
And Part IV.B describes how states can create a very basic legal framework
to encourage cross-border insurance. This framework would (1) legally
authorize insurers to utilize foreign providers, (2) give insurers flexibility to
design plans that actually appeal to the uninsured, (3) specify minimum
coverage requirements, (4) identify regulatory proxies for ensuring quality
care, and (5) address other legal hurdles that presently discourage cross-
border care. This framework incorporates lessons from the only two states
that have formally addressed cross-border insurance: California, which in
1998 legalized cross-border plans for a narrow population;9 and Texas,
which in 2007 banned such plans altogether.'o This framework builds on
California's experience and addresses the concerns animating the ban in
Texas. Part IV.B.6 addresses the normative ambiguities of cross-border
insurance.
Part V then envisions ways that states can leverage alternative
regulatory methods to impose standards on cross-border plans and ensure
quality care overseas, which is the most frequently cited concern. It
explains why "new governance" is particularly well suited for addressing
phenomena like cross-border health care that reside beyond the purview of
domestic regulators." Part V then examines how new governance is
valence of various terminologies, see Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens " and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 276-79 (1997).
8. As noted in infra Part III.C, hospitals have repatriated not only unauthorized immigrants, but
also authorized immigrants.
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1345, 1351.2 (West 2008).
10. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1216.004 (West 2010).
I1. For a definition of "new governance," see infra Part V.A. Louise Trubek and Tamara Hervey
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already being used in the cross-border industry (for example, international
hospital accreditation has become a de facto industry standard), before
recommending additional methods to ensure quality care, such as
conditioning insurance reimbursement on meeting quality criteria, using
international networks to develop best practices, and mobilizing the recent
proliferation of border health initiatives to educate immigrants about the
value of insurance. 12
Part VI concludes by addressing the proposal's limitations-for
example, cross-border insurance will not cover everyone left out of health
reform-and argues that despite these limitations, cross-border plans are
perhaps the only alternative for some uninsured residents, short of a system
that provides genuine universal coverage.
Throughout, the Article confronts a fundamental normative question:
How much should we reconfigure our standards to make health care more
accessible? If our laws are designed to regulate domestic care and do not
contemplate foreign care, to what extent should we relax or reimagine these
laws? I argue that if a significant portion of residents cannot afford health
care in the United States-and if we are not prepared to provide it
publicly-we should help patients seek it elsewhere. Even after health
reform, our system will not achieve universal coverage, a result that is hard
to justify for a nation with our resources. Cross-border insurance certainly
is not the first-best option here. But as others grappling with the residual
uninsured have noted, "if there were ever an occasion to avoid the ideal
becoming the enemy of the good, surely this is it.""
In this vein, my proposal is very much animated by the blunt reality
that our health care and immigration systems do not provide all care at all
times to all people, regardless of one's immigration status or ability to pay.
Given these realities, cross-border insurance may represent our best option
for covering many of those who remain uninsured.
have been early proponents of applying new governance to health care. See generally Tamara Hervey &
Louise Trubek, Freedom to Provide Health Care Services Within the EU: An Opportunity for a
Transformative Directive, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 623 (2007).
12. See, e.g., Margaret A. Laws, Foundation Approaches to US.-Mexico Border and Binational
Health Funding, 21 HEALTH AFF. 271, 275 (2002).
13. Mark A. Hall, After Insurance Reform: An Adequate Safety Net Can Bring Us to Universal
Coverage, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 9, 10, available at http://www.tseed.com/
aslme/conference/forSystemUse/papers/05 1.pdf.
864 [Vol. 84:859
2011] EMBRACING THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF HEALTH CARE
II. WHO ARE THE UNINSURED AND HOW DO THEY ACCESS
CARE?
To understand how foreign providers have become a safety valve for
our health care system, it is important to understand who is uninsured in the
United States, who will remain so after health reform, and how they access
care. A brief analysis suggests that cross-border insurance might be a
viable alternative for a significant portion of them.
A. WHO IS UNINSURED Now?
Fifty million U.S. residents currently lack health insurance,
representing 17 percent of the nonelderly population.14 And as many as
eighty-two million may be uninsured at some point during a two-year
span-roughly a third of the nonelderly population.' 5 Despite general
perceptions, the uninsured are not a cohesive, monolithic identity group,
but are diverse demographically and even economically.16
Demographically, the uninsured span every age, race, and citizenship
status.17 Yet some categories claim more uninsured than others. One in
three Hispanics lacks insurance compared to about one in ten non-Hispanic
whites.' 8 The young are more likely to be uninsured than the old.19 The
South and West have markedly higher numbers of uninsured than the
Northeast and Midwest.20 The foreign born are almost three times more
likely to be uninsured than the native born.21 And of the foreign born,
noncitizens are more than twice as likely to be uninsured than naturalized
14. See CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 9, app. tbl.4. The latest official data estimated that in 2008,
46.3 million U.S. residents lacked health insurance. Less than 2 percent of the Medicare population
aged sixty-five and older lacked insurance. DENAVAS-WALT, PROCTOR & SMITH, supra note 4, at 23
tbl.8. Before health reform, experts predicted that roughly fifty-six million people would be uninsured
by 2013. Todd Gilmer & Richard Kronick, It's the Premiums, Stupid: Projections of the Uninsured
Through 2013, 24 HEALTH AFF. W5-143, W5-143 (Apr. 5, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
contentlearly/2005/04/05/hlthaff.w5.143.full.pdf.
15. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 537, 540 (2006) (citing a Families USA study which
found that eighty-two million residents were uninsured at some point during 2002 and 2003).
16. Id. at 540-42; I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REv. 1467, 1524 (2010); Nan D. Hunter, Risk Governance
and Deliberative Democracy in Health Care, 97 GEO. L.J. 1, 58 (2008).
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citizens.22 So even though the uninsured are diverse demographically, some
patterns do emerge.
The uninsured are also unexpectedly diverse economically. More than
9 percent live in households that earn $75,000 or more annually, and 25
percent live in households that earn at least $50,000.23 Sixty-nine percent
were employed during the year24-although many work part-time, for
themselves, in temporary jobs, or for employers that do not offer
insurance. 25 But again, patterns emerge. Most of the uninsured have low or
very low incomes, below or near the poverty line.26 Therefore, although the
uninsured are demographically and economically diverse, some
populations tend to lack insurance more than others.
In addition to the fifty million uninsured, another twenty-five million
are "underinsured" because they bear out-of-pocket expenses and cost-
sharing obligations that are excessive relative to their incomes. 27 This
population is also rising, partly reflecting the trend of insurers pushing
costs onto the insured. 28 Together, the un- and underinsured total nearly
seventy-five million-roughly 42 percent of the U.S. adult population.29
Thus, a surprisingly large number of U.S. residents must rely on so-called
"safety net" programs that offer free or very low-cost care. 30
Further complicating this picture, immigrants access care in complex
ways, caught in the hydraulics between perhaps our two most dysfunctional
systems, immigration and health care.31 Both unauthorized and authorized




25. Jost, supra note 15, at 540-41.
26. Id at 541; DENAVAS-WALT, PROCTOR & SMITH, supra note 4, at 23 tbl.8.
27. Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003 and
2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. w298, w298-99 (June 10, 2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/4/
w298.full.pdf.
28. Id at w298.
29. Id. at w301 (exhibit 1) (noting that out of 177 million U.S. adults, roughly 74.7 million either
lacked insurance or were underinsured during the year 2007).
30. These patients tend to be some of the most vulnerable. A disproportionate number of the
chronically ill, the mentally ill, the disabled, substance abusers, and those with communicable diseases
rely on "safety net programs," defined as "providers that organize and deliver a significant level of
health care... to uninsured, Medicaid, and other vulnerable patients." INST. OF MED., AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET: INTACT BUT ENDANGERED 3, 49-54, 180-98 (Marion Ein Lewin & Stuart
Altman eds., 2000). Other vulnerable populations, such as the elderly, low-income children, and
pregnant women, also tend to rely on the safety net. Raymond J. Baxter & Robert E. Mechanic, The
Status ofLocal Health Care Safety Nets, 16 HEALTH AFF. 7, 9 (1997).
31. See Deborah Sontag, Deported, by US. Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, at Al.
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because they work part-time jobs or for industries or smaller companies
that tend not to offer any.3 2 Others are reluctant to buy insurance because of
their immigration status, or because they simply cannot afford it.3 And a
growing proportion of immigrants are undocumented, uninsured, or both.34
Unsurprisingly, immigrants tend to rely on safety net providers more than
nonimmigrants,35 and the demand for free or discounted care tends to be
higher in areas with large immigrant populations.36 Immigrants also tend to
reside in medically underserved areas for which providers in Mexico or
other countries might be more accessible, economically if not also
geographically. 37
Some of these difficulties derive from benign neglect, but some reflect
official policy. In 1996, Congress sharply limited immigrant access to
Medicaid and most other public health benefits by making unauthorized
"aliens" completely ineligible, and by requiring five- or even ten-year
waiting periods for "qualified aliens." 38  Therefore, Congress has
exacerbated the problem and even cut new holes in our health care system
for many immigrants. Given these gaps, it is not surprising that foreign
providers have emerged as an alternate source of care.
B. WHO WILL REMAIN UNINSURED AFTER HEALTH REFORM?
Over the next decade, the landmark Affordable Care Act is predicted
to reduce the number of uninsured from fifty-four million to twenty-three
32. See Laura Sullivan, Latinos in California and Texas and Access to Health Care, in CROSS-
BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS 1, 7 (Policy Research Project on Cross-Border
Health Ins. ed., 2004), available at http://www.utexas.edullbj/chasp/publications/downloads/Cross_
Border HealthInsurance.pdf (focusing on the Latino immigrant population).
33. Id. See also Laws, supra note 12, at 271 ("A large percentage of border residents and
migrants live at or below the poverty level, are uninsured, and lack access to health care providers.").
34. Marion E. Lewin & Raymond J. Baxter, America's Health Care Safety Net: Revisiting the
2000 IOMReport, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1491 (2007).
35. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 49-51.
36. Baxter & Mechanic, supra note 30, at 13.
37. See Sullivan, supra note 32, at 4 (noting, for example, that Southern California is a key
destination for Mexican immigrants to California).
38. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, §§ 401-404, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261-67 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611-1614 (2006)).
This Act prohibits unauthorized "aliens" from enrolling in Medicaid and other public benefit programs,
and created a five-year waiting period for "qualified aliens." Id. Those who must file an affidavit of
support agreeing that the applicant will not become a public charge must wait ten years to qualify. Id.
§ 421, 110 Stat. at 2270 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1631). Note also that states and cities may
use their own money to care for unauthorized aliens beyond what is allowed by Medicaid, as California
and New York City do. See Richard Wolf, Rising Health Care Costs Put Focus on Illegal Immigrants,
USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-01-21-immigrant-
healthcare N.htm.
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million, "about one-third of whom would be unauthorized immigrants." 39
Yet over the next four years-before several major provisions take effect in
2014-roughly fifty million U.S. residents will remain uninsured,40 and
potentially more given the prolonged recession and lingering high
unemployment. As I demonstrate below, cross-border insurance might be a
surprisingly feasible alternative for some of the uninsured.
So who will remain uninsured? That is, who will not be among the
estimated thirty-two million that will obtain coverage after health reform's
medley of mandates, subsidies, tax credits, public program expansions, and
insurance market reforms take effect? It may be helpful to describe who
stands to benefit from health reform before describing the residuum. Those
who should benefit from reform are primarily those who will be required to
obtain health insurance under the controversial new personal mandate.41
Most of the Act's provisions are designed to make insurance more
affordable to this population who, beginning in 2014, must either purchase
insurance or pay a tax penalty.4 2 This population will access insurance in a
number of ways under the Act.
First, around twenty-four million residents are expected to purchase
individual policies via new state-created health benefit "exchanges."43
These exchanges are designed to provide a competitive insurance
marketplace for individuals who are not offered employer-sponsored
insurance and are not eligible for public programs like Medicaid.4 The Act
is designed to liberate and stimulate the individual insurance market,
notorious for being more expensive and less generous with benefits than
group plans.45 The Act, however, does not require states to establish these
exchanges until 2014.46 Moreover, the Act expressly limits access to the
exchanges to "citizens and lawful residents"; those who do not fall into
either category "may not be covered." 47 Thus, unauthorized immigrants
may not purchase insurance in the new exchanges, even without the benefit
39. CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 9, app. tbl.4.
40. Id. at app. tbl.4.
41. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119,
242-49 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091).
42. Id. § 1501(b), 24 Stat. at 242.
43. CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 9.
44. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1311-1324, 124 Stat. at 173-99. Policies
offered in the exchanges must meet criteria for a "qualified health plan" and provide an essential
benefits package. Id. §§ 1301-1302, 124 Stat. at 162-68.
45. Roland McDevitt et al., Group Insurance: A Better Deal for Most People Than Individual
Plans, 29 HEALTH AFF. 156, 162-63 (2010).
46. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311 (b)(1), 124 Stat. at 173.
47. Id. § 1312(f), 124 Stat. at 183-84.
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of federal subsidies or tax credits.
Second, the Act significantly expands eligibility for Medicaid and the
State Children's Health Insurance Program ("CHIP").48 Without reform,
Medicaid and CHIP enrollment was expected to drop from forty million to
thirty-five million by 2019.49 But after reform, enrollment is expected to
rise to fifty-six million.so Beginning in 2014, the Act expands eligibility to
those with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty line given their
household's size, and determines eligibility primarily by income. 5 1
Currently, states set income eligibility requirements that are markedly
lower, and attach several nonincome criteria that significantly limit
eligibility largely to "children and some parents, pregnant women, those
who are permanently and totally disabled, and the elderly." 52 Thus, until
2014, Medicaid will continue to cover less than half of those with incomes
at or below the poverty line.53 The new law seeks to cover substantially
more than that-turning Medicaid into a genuine insurance program for the
poor. But again, unauthorized immigrants are not eligible for Medicaid and
CHIP, and even many authorized immigrants must wait several years to
become eligible. 54
Third, the Act will increase access to private, employer-sponsored
insurance for some and reduce it for others. Over the next decade,
employers are projected to cover an additional six to seven million who
would not be covered under current law because the individual mandate
will increase employee demand for coverage.55 But at the same time,
between eight and nine million are predicted to lose coverage from
employers who elect to pay a fee rather than offer coverage-primarily
''smaller employers and employers that predominantly employ lower-wage
workers." 56 Moreover, between one and two million who currently have
employer-sponsored insurance would likely purchase individual policies in
the state exchanges, although they generally would be ineligible for cost-
sharing subsidies." Thus, the net number of people insured through their
48. See infra note I10 and accompanying text.
49. CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 9, app. tbl.4.
50. Id.
51. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271-79.
52. Sidney D. Watson, Commercialization of Medicaid, 45 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 53, 57 (2001). See
also KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 1-2 (2011),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7993-02.pdf
53. Watson, supra note 52, at 57 & n.26.
54. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
55. CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 10, app. tbl.4.
56. Id. at 10.
57. Id.
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employers in 2019 is expected to be about three million less than it is
now.58 Overall, the effect on access to private, employer-sponsored
insurance is hard to predict. But many smaller employers and those who
tend to employ lower-wage employees are predicted to drop coverage, 59
which affects certain populations more than others.
Finally, the Act creates alternatives to the controversial "public
option" that drafters excised during the legislative process.6 0 For example,
the Act creates local, member-run, nonprofit insurance "cooperatives" that
are intended to compete with private plans in the new exchanges.61
Likewise, the Act allows the U.S. Office of Personnel Management to
contract with insurers to offer multistate plans in each exchange. 62 There is
considerable speculation whether these will serve as meaningful
alternatives that will force private insurers to offer better policies at lower
prices. But what is not speculative is that these will not be alternatives
available to unauthorized immigrants. 63
Indeed, Congress took pains to clarify that health reform will not help
those who are not lawfully present. In short, the Affordable Care Act
explicitly prohibits those who are not "lawfully present" from (1) accessing
temporary high-risk pools for those with preexisting conditions;64
(2) enrolling in special state-created plans for low-income individuals not
eligible for Medicaid; 65 (3) enrolling in new health care cooperatives; 66
(4) receiving cost-sharing subsidies or premium tax credits to purchase
health insurance; 67 and (5) purchasing policies in the newly created
exchanges, even without the benefit of government subsidies or credits.68
58. Id
59. See id.
60. The House legislation contained a government-run "public health insurance option."
Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 321-331 (2009). The public
option was not included in the Senate bill (H.R. 3590) and was not a part of the final health reform
legislation.
61. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1322, 124 Stat. 119,
187-92 (2010) (referring to the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan, or "CO-OP").
62. Id. §§ 1334, 10104(q), 124 Stat. at 902-06.
63. Id. § 1312(f)(3), 124 Stat. at 184. Even ifCongress had passed a public option, the likelihood
is close to nil that it would have been available to unauthorized immigrants.
64. Id. § I 101(d)(3), 124 Stat. at 142.
65. Id. § 1331(e)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 202-03.
66. Id. § 1322, 124 Stat. at 187-92.
67. See, e.g., id. § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213-20 (amending I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(B) (2006), limiting
tax credits to aliens lawfully present); id § 1402(e)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 223 (stating that no cost-sharing
reductions shall apply to individuals not lawfully present); id. § 1412(d), 124 Stat. at 233 ("Nothing in
this subtitle or the amendments made by this subtitle allows Federal payments, credits, or cost-sharing
reductions for individuals who are not lawfully present in the United States.").
68. Id. § 1312(f)(3), 124 Stat. at 184. Note that those not lawfully present are generally exempt
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Although critics claim these requirements will not be enforced, the Act
specifically calls for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to determine whether individuals are "eligible," which includes
ascertaining whether they are lawfully present.69 Exchange applicants must
provide information about their citizenship or immigration status, 70 which
will be verified by the Department of Homeland Security and cross-
checked against other agency databases.7 1
Congress was much more charitable toward immigrants who are
lawfully present. Health reform treats the lawfully present similarly to U.S.
citizens and nationals, in that they generally are subject to the individual
mandate,72 eligible to purchase plans in the exchanges,73 and eligible to
receive premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies. 74 The Medicaid
gap, however, largely remains for authorized immigrants. Reform did not
alter the immigration-related eligibility rules for means-tested programs
like Medicaid, so lawfully present immigrants that are required to maintain
insurance under the new personal mandate still might not be eligible for
Medicaid for five years or longer.
To partially compensate, the new law makes two special
accommodations. First, "aliens lawfully present" who have incomes below
100% of the federal poverty line, but who are not eligible for Medicaid in
their state "by reason of such alien status," may enroll in alternative plans
created by states to cover low-income individuals who also are not eligible
for Medicaid.75 Second, such aliens are also eligible to receive premium tax
credits and cost-sharing subsidies at levels equivalent to those who have
incomes equal to 100% of the federal poverty line.76 So legal immigrants
not eligible for Medicaid whose household incomes are below 100% of the
poverty line generally will have their premiums capped at 2% of their
income pursuant to the tax credit, and will have out-of-pocket cost-sharing
from the individual insurance mandate, id. § 1501, 124 Stat. at 242-49 (amending I.R.C.
§ 5000A(d)(3)), although other classes of immigrants are not, see RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40889, NONCITIZEN ELIGIBILITY AND VERIFICATION ISSUES IN THE HEALTH CARE
REFORM LEGISLATION 3 tbl.1 (2010).
69. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1411, 124 Stat. at 224-31.
70. Id. § 1411(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 224.
71. Id § 1411(c)(2), 124 Stat. at 226.
72. Id. § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244-49.
73. Id. § 1312(f)(3), 124 Stat. at 184; id. § 1411, 124 Stat. at 224-31.
74. Id. § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213-20 (amending I.R.C. § 36B(e)(2) (2006)); id. § 1402(e)(2), 124
Stat. at 220-23.
75. Id. § 1401(c)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 215-16.
76. Id. § 1401(c)(1)(B)(ii), 124 Stat. at 216.
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subsidized by two-thirds." But insurance may still be too expensive even
with these credits and subsidies. And immigrants above 100% but below
133% of the federal poverty line will qualify for cost-sharing subsidies but
not tax credits, because tax credits begin at 133% of the federal poverty
line 78-a possibly unintended gap.
In sum, of the twenty-three million who will remain uninsured in ten
years, some will simply fall through the cracks, and others (particularly
unauthorized immigrants) will remain uninsured as a matter of design.
Although unauthorized immigrants are not subject to the new personal
mandate, 79 neither do they benefit from reforms designed to make
insurance more accessible to those who are. Moreover, until 2014-before
the mandates, exchanges, and Medicaid expansions take effect-roughly
fifty million U.S. residents will remain uninsured, and possibly more given
lingering high unemployment during this prolonged recession.
C. How Do THE UNINSURED ACCESS CARE?
To understand how foreign providers have become an alternate source
of care, we must first understand how the un- and underinsured access care
in the United States. Those without adequate insurance generally rely on
our health care safety net, loosely defined as "providers that organize and
deliver a significant level of health care ... to uninsured, Medicaid, and
other vulnerable patients."80
The core safety net consists of public and nonprofit providers that care
for patients regardless of their ability to pay-either because the providers
are legally required or have made it their mission to do so."' For example,
roughly one thousand federally funded community health centers care for
medically underserved populations like the homeless, public housing
residents, and migrant workers; 82 around 1300 public hospitals offer more
77. Id. § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213-20 (amending I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)); id. § 1402(c)(1), 124 Stat.
at 221.
78. Id. § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213-20. Generally, the sliding scales for tax credits begin at 133
percent of the poverty line, assuming those below it will enroll in Medicaid under the new income
criteria.
79. Id. § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244-49 adds Section 5000A(d)(3) to the Internal Revenue Code,
which defines "applicable individuals" who are required to "maintain minimum essential coverage" as
excluding "individuals not lawfully present."
80. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 3. See also Bruce Siegel, Marsha Regenstein & Peter Shin,
Health Reform and the Safety Net: Big Opportunities; Major Risks, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 426, 426
(2004).
81. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 3-4.
82. Stephen L. Isaacs & Paul Jellinek, Is There a (Volunteer) Doctor in the House? Free Clinics
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specialized treatments, particularly in large urban areas; 83  academic
hospitals and affiliated medical schools also provide specialized care for a
large volume of indigent patients; 84 and 3000 local health departments care
for vulnerable patients, particularly those with special health needs.85
Another layer of specialty providers-free clinics, family planning centers,
and school-based programs-crop up periodically to fill holes left by the
larger safety net programs.86
This public and nonprofit core is flanked by an even more scattered
periphery of private providers. For example, private practitioners offer a
substantial proportion of medical care to the uninsured in some
communities, and emerging local referral networks send uninsured patients
from community health centers and clinics to private specialists that treat
them for free.87 Pharmaceutical companies have long been a source of free
and discounted drugs for low-income patients by distributing free samples,
and more recently by operating patient assistance programs." Retail clinics
like Wal-Mart and Walgreen have emerged as a unique alternative for the
un- and underinsured because they satisfy a growing demand for
immediately accessible low-cost care, accepting only out-of-pocket
payments rather than insurance reimbursement.89 Thus, the private sector
and Volunteer Physician Referral Networks in the United States, 26 HEALTH AFF. 871, 872 (2007);
Siegel, Regenstein & Shin, supra note 80, at 426-27. See also 42 U.S.C. § 254b (2006).
83. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 4, 55-59; Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank C. Ullman, Health
Insurance and Health Access: Reengineering Local Safety Nets, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 247, 251-52 (2001);
Isaacs & Jellinek, supra note 82, at 872; Siegel, Regenstein & Shin, supra note 80, at 427.
84. Baxter & Mechanic, supra note 30, at 20. Note that some remain uneasy with indigent
patients bearing the brunt of physician training at these facilities. See, e.g., ATUL GAWANDE,
COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT SCIENCE 31-33 (2002).
85. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 4, 63-65; Isaacs & Jellinek, supra note 82, at 872.
86. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 4, 69; Lawrence D. Brown, The Amazing Noncollapsing
U.S. Health Care System-Is Reform Finally at Hand?, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325, 325 (2008); Isaacs
& Jellinek, supra note 82, at 872.
87. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 6, 67-68. Between 1996 and 2005, the number of private
physicians providing charity care dropped from 76 percent to 68 percent despite growing demand.
Isaacs & Jellinek, supra note 82, at 871. The Institute of Medicine also found that "physicians have
been increasingly less willing to treat uninsured patients." Lewin & Baxter, supra note 34, at 1492.
Such care remains an underappreciated part of the safety net, as roughly four out of five uninsured or
Medicaid patients receive primary care in a physician's office. Thus, almost any decline in physicians
providing charity care represents a genuine decrease in the overall quantity of safety net services
available. Isaacs & Jellinek, supra note 82, at 871-72.
88. Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare
Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,624 (Nov. 22, 2005). In 2004, the pharmaceutical industry
gave away $16.4 billion worth of free drug samples. Sarah L. Cutrona et al., Characteristics of
Recipients of Free Prescription Drug Samples: A Nationally Representative Analysis, 98 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 284, 284 (2008). Observers note, however, that few samples flow to low-income patients,
concluding that "free drug samples serve as a marketing tool, not as a safety net." Id. at 284.
89. See William M. Sage, Might the Fact that 90% of Americans Live Within 15 Miles ofa Wal-
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also provides a range of basic and specialty care to those without adequate
insurance.
Finally, emergency departments serve as a true provider of last resort.
Federal law requires them to screen all patients and stabilize those with
emergent conditions. 90 Because emergency departments cannot turn away
patients, they "are the only providers who offer immediate care for the full
range of medical and surgical conditions to any individual, of any age,
regardless of his or her ability to pay."91 Therefore, emergency care may be
"the only type of health care to which access is guaranteed by law in this
country" 92 and the closest thing to a national health care entitlement that we
have.93
Together, this loose constellation of public, nonprofit, and private
safety net providers cares for the un- and underinsured. But this safety net
is weak and vulnerable, leaving gaps that foreign providers increasingly
fill.
Our domestic safety net is severely fragmented and lacks any
Mart Help Achieve Universal Health Care?, 55 KAN. L. REv. 1233 (2007). In 2009, the Walgreen
pharmacy chain announced that it would offer free clinic services to unemployed and uninsured
customers until the end of the year. Walgreen runs 341 clinics around the country that provide a range
of primary care, as well as services that uninsured patients might otherwise seek from emergency rooms
or urgent care centers. Walgreen reports that the clinics treated 1.2 million patients between November
2005 and May 2007, 30 percent of whom were uninsured. Walgreen Giving Free Care to Jobless and
Uninsured, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 31, 2009.
90. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
(2006). EMTALA requires emergency departments to stabilize patients regardless of their immigration
status. To some, EMTALA encourages immigration to the United States by offering a public benefit.
ALISON M. SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31630, FEDERAL FUNDING FOR UNAUTHORIZED
ALIENS' EMERGENCY MEDICAL EXPENSES 13 (2004), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/
handle/1 0207/bitstreams/1 544.pdf. To others, it creates a perverse financial anomaly in which hospitals
can obtain federal funds for providing expensive emergency care but not routine preventative care.
Morgan Greenspon, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act and Sources of Funding,
17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 309, 312-13 (2008) (noting, for example, that EMTALA reimburses emergency
labor but not prenatal care). Although EMTALA applies only to hospitals that receive Medicare
funding, hospitals generally must accept Medicare and state-sponsored health insurance to survive, and
thus, it applies to virtually all hospitals with emergency departments. Id. at 311-12.
91. Lynne D. Richardson & Ula Hwang, America's Health Care Safety Net: Intact or
Unraveling?, 8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1056, 1057 (2001). See also Siegel, Regenstein & Shin,
supra note 80, at 427.
92. Richardson & Hwang, supra note 91, at 1056. Note, however, that some states require local
governments to provide health care to indigent residents. For example, Texas counties must provide at
least basic care to indigent residents. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 61.022 (West 2010);
CAROL KEETON STRAYHORN, OFFICE OF THE TEX. COMPTROLLER, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN
TEXAS: A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT TO THE STATE BUDGET AND ECONOMY 10 (2006),
available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/undocumented/undocumented.pdf
93. Bovbjerg & Ullman, supra note 83, at 251-52.
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discernible organization, due partly to multiple sources of financing and
partly to the reality that providers are part of the safety net "typically [as] a
matter of mission and location rather than legal obligation."94 Although
some laws require some providers to offer uncompensated care (usually as
a matter of tax, nonprofit, or emergency medical law), there is no general
legal obligation to do so.95 Moreover, no single entity is responsible for
overseeing or coordinating safety net care.
A correlated problem is that our safety net is financially vulnerable.
Most safety net providers rely on a multitude of funding sources that come
and go. Medicaid-the largest means-tested health care program in the
United States-constitutes the "financial underpinning of the safety net."96
But safety net providers also rely to varying degrees on funding from
Medicaid, federal and state grants and subsidies, and a wide array of
private charity.97 Shortfalls in any one source can threaten a provider's
financial viability. And some providers seem virtually destined to go
bankrupt. For example, public hospitals often "treat Medicaid and
Medicare patients for less than cost; provide trauma units and AIDS clinics
that consistently lose money; and provide medical care to the uninsured,
often for free."98 Not surprisingly, many public hospitals report net
operating losses.99 Indeed, the Institute of Medicine found that safety net
providers of all kinds struggle financially. 00
Finally, our safety net is also highly localized, varying dramatically
depending on each community's unique local circumstances and blend of
funding.' Care itself is provided locally by public hospitals, academic
medical centers, community clinics, and office-based physicians.' 02 And
while federal and state programs focus on their own beneficiaries, cities
and counties that run public hospitals are left to deal with the remainder. 0 3
94. Id. at 252 (internal punctuation omitted).
95. Id.
96. INST. OF MED., supra note 30, at 5.
97. Siegel, Regenstein & Shin, supra note 80, at 427.
98. Stuart H. Altman, David Shactman & Efrat Eilat, Could U.S. Hospitals Go The Way of U.S.
Airlines?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 11, I1, 20-21 n. 1 (2006) (including not only public hospitals, but also profit
and not-for-profit hospitals).
99. Amy Yarbrough Landry & Robert J. Landry III, Factors Associated with Hospital
Bankruptcies: A Political and Economic Framework, 54 J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 252, 253 (2009)
(noting that forty-two acute care hospitals filed for bankruptcy between 2000 and 2006); Lewin &
Baxter, supra note 34, at 1491.
100. Lewin & Baxter, supra note 34, at 1491.
101. Baxter & Mechanic, supra note 30, at 12; Brown, supra note 86, at 325; Siegel, Regenstein
& Shin, supra note 80, at 426.
102. Bovbjerg & Ullman, supra note 83, at 247-48.
103. Id. at 256-57.
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Moreover, the financial viability of local safety net providers is determined
not only by the number of un- and underinsured that demand care, but also
by the number of insureds that can cross-subsidize this care.1 04 Thus, the
safety net in southern Texas might look very different from the safety net in
northern Minnesota. 05 Fortunately, some well-functioning local safety nets
have proven to be cost-effective alternatives to universal insurance
coverage in various localities.106 But not everyone is lucky enough to live
in such an area.
In many ways, the safety net's defining traits-fragmentation and
local variation-reflect our broader health care system. 07 Like our safety
net, our health care system is highly fragmented.' In fact, much like our
health care system, calling our safety net a "system" is being charitable-
some more accurately describe it as a "nonsystem" or an "incoherent
pastiche."' 09 Moreover, when holes in the safety net appear, we try to patch
them by creating even more programs, only adding to the fragmentation. 0
This patching and repatching helps explain how foreign providers have
become a necessary safety valve. The un- and underinsured simply cannot
always rely on domestic safety net providers, and some have begun to look
elsewhere.
III. THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF HEALTH CARE
Foreign medical providers have become a safety valve for three major
constituents of the U.S. health care system: patients, insurers, and hospitals.
104. Id. at 252-53.
105. Id at 253 (comparing safety net providers in Texas, where 26 percent are uninsured, to those
in Minnesota, where 8 percent are uninsured).
106. Mark Hall has studied how some local safety nets are serving as cost-effective alternatives to
universal insurance coverage. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE COSTS
AND ADEQUACY OF SAFETY NET ACCESS FOR THE UNINSURED (2010), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/healthpolicy/product.jsp?id=49869 (reporting on the health care safety nets in San
Antonio, Texas; Denver, Colorado; Boston, Massachusetts; Asheville, North Carolina; Flint, Michigan;
Exeter and Portsmouth, New Hampshire; and South Coastal Maine); Hall, supra note 13, at 9.
107. Indeed, some view our safety net as one part of a tripartite health care system, along with the
public and private sectors. George J. Annas, Health Care Reform in America: Beyond Ideology, 5 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 441, 448 (2008).
108. Brown, supra note 86, at 326. See also THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE:
CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 2010) (discussing the meaning, causes, and solutions to
this fragmentation).
109. Brown, supra note 86, at 325.
110. For example, when it became apparent that many families with children were uninsured and
did not qualify for Medicaid, Congress created CHIP. State Children's Health Insurance Program, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-jj (2006), added by Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 103-33, §§ 4901-
4923, Ill Star. 251, 552-75.
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Together, their reliance on foreign providers is not only a symptom of what
ails our health care system, but also may be a potential solution.
A. PATIENT MOBILITY
In the last few years, providers in a dozen or so low- and middle-
income countries have become alternatives for some U.S. patients by
offering medical care of comparable quality for a fraction of the U.S.
price-usually 50-90 percent less than what U.S. counterparts charge.'1 '
Hospitals in countries like India, Thailand, and Mexico have become a
valid option for Western patients with varied backgrounds, financial means,
and medical needs. 112 For example, in one of the earliest and most
publicized cases, a medical tourist testified at a 2006 Senate hearing that a
patient she traveled with spent $6700 for life-prolonging heart surgery in
India because U.S. providers would have charged the patient anywhere
from $50,000 to $200,000.113 Similar stories abound.1 4 In 2006, two
economists demonstrated that patients could save considerable amounts by
leaving the United States for various procedures, even when factoring in
travel expenses.115 Indeed, a burgeoning industry has emerged to connect
patients with foreign providers,1 6 seeking to capture obvious gains from
trade. 117 Thus, in a relatively short time, foreign providers have become a
safety valve for the most expensive health care system in the world.
No one, however, really knows how many patients leave the United
States for medical care. Despite several attempts to measure the market and
map its trajectory, the data remains frustratingly incomplete and unreliable.
Estimates from both industry and foreign government sources seem
111. See, e.g., Aaditya Mattoo & Randeep Rathindran, How Health Insurance Inhibits Trade in
Health Care, 25 HEALTH AFF. 358, 361 ex..1 (2006).
112. See Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for Patients and
the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 IND. L.J. 71,79-82 (2008).
113. The Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?:
Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 109th Cong. 9, 13 (2006) (written statement of
Maggi Ann Grace) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
114. A basic search for the phrases "medical tourism" or "medical tourist" in the "All News"
database of Westlaw yields 5305 results over the last three years.
115. Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 111, at 359, 361-62.
116. For example, the 4th Annual World Medical Tourism & Global Healthcare Congress is
expected to register up to 2000 attendees and up to 140 exhibitors and sponsors. See Medical Tourism
Conference, MED. TOURISM ASS'N, http://www.medicaltourismassociation.com/en/medicaltourism
conference.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
117. Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 111, at 358 (estimating that the United States could save
$1.4 billion per year if only 10 percent of patients seeking one of fifteen medical procedures traveled
abroad).
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inflated, sometimes wildly so.' 8 Even two mainstream consulting firms
produced radically disparate estimates: McKinsey & Company calculated
that only 5000-10,000 Americans leave the country each year for inpatient
procedures, while Deloitte calculated that 750,000 U.S. patients traveled
overseas in 2007 for both inpatient and outpatient procedures, predicting
that by 2010 the number would rise to six million." 9 Between these
extremes, most indicators point toward an unprecedented migration of U.S.
patients.
We also lack reliable data describing who travels and why, making it
difficult to ascertain which medical tourists would otherwise rely on
domestic safety net programs. But again, emerging evidence suggests that
certain populations that rely on safety net providers are also more likely to
visit foreign providers, including (1) the un- and underinsured; (2) those
with high-deductible and other consumer-directed health plans that impose
high cost-sharing obligations (some of whom might be considered to be
underinsured as well); and (3) immigrants, including both the authorized
and unauthorized. 20
The un- and underinsured are the most logical candidates to utilize
foreign providers because they are more likely than the adequately insured
to have sufficient financial incentives and perhaps also be in desperate
medical need.121 The un- and underinsured include several subpopulations
that might rely on foreign providers precisely because they have fallen
118. Ian Youngman, How Many American Medical Tourists Are There?, INT'L MED. TRAVEL J.
(2009), http://www.imtjonline.com/articles/2009/how-many-americans-go-abroad-for-treatment-30016
(noting that within a two-year period, the estimates of medial tourists ranged from 150,000 to one
million). See also Ian Youngman, Medical Tourism Statistics: Why McKinsey Has Got It Wrong, INT'L
MED. TRAVEL J. (2009), http://www.imtjonline.com/articles/2009/mckinsey-wrong-medical-travel
[hereinafter Youngman, Why McKinsey Has Got It Wrong] (noting that past estimates show "agencies,
experts, politicians and hospitals ... make ludicrous estimates of actual or potential numbers").
119. Tilman Ehrbeck, Ceani Guevara & Paul D. Mango, Mapping the Market for Medical Travel,
McKINSEY Q., May 2008, at 2, 3, 6; DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, MEDICAL TOURISM:
CONSUMERS IN SEARCH OF VALUE 4 (2008), http://www.deloitte.com//assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local
%20Assets/Documents/uschsMedicalTourismStudy(3).pdf. Like other estimates in this field, the
McKinsey and Deloitte estimates are flawed. McKinsey's estimate excludes both outpatients and
patients traveling in largely "contiguous geographies," even though outpatients likely constitute a large
percentage of medical tourists, and travel within contiguous geographies includes a significant number
of patients traveling between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Youngman, Why McKinsey Has
Got It Wrong, supra note 118. At the same time, Deloitte recently shaved its prediction that five or six
million Americans would travel for care in 2010 to 1.6 million people. Tom Murphy, Health Insurers
Explore Savings in Overseas Care, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 23, 2009.
120. Note that for purposes of this analysis, I exclude patients traveling overseas for elective
cosmetic procedures and those traveling primarily for procedures or technologies not allowed in the
United States.
121. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1479-81; Cortez, supra note 112, at 81-82.
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through the cracks in our domestic safety net. For example, many
uninsured patients earn too much to qualify for means-tested programs like
Medicaid.122 Roughly 80 percent of the uninsured are either employed or
live with someone who is,123 and in 2009, approximately 25 percent of the
uninsured lived in households that earned more than $50,000.124 Many of
these patients either choose not to purchase or cannot afford private
insurance, which in 2008 cost the average family $12,298.125 As I note
above, health reform will gradually narrow these gaps in coverage but will
not completely eliminate them. So foreign providers have become and will
remain a viable alternative.
Foreign providers have also become an option for patients who are too
young to qualify for Medicare, our public insurance program for those ages
sixty-five and older.126 Pre-Medicare patients struggle on two fronts:
employers are significantly reducing retiree health benefits, and it is often
prohibitively expensive for patients approaching Medicare age to purchase
quality individual insurance in the private market.127 As a result, some have
called for Congress to extend Medicare benefits to early retirees,128 and the
White House recently announced that it would begin subsidizing medical
bills for pre-Medicare retirees who rely on employer-sponsored
122. Criteria for Medicaid eligibility are difficult to generalize because, until several provisions in
the Affordable Care Act take effect in 2014, each state continues to set its own requirements, and
different income and resource limits apply to different beneficiary categories and family sizes. In
general, states cap eligibility at a certain percentage of the Federal Poverty Level. For example, the
income threshold for a working parent in a family of four in California is 106 percent of the Federal
Poverty Level, which translates to an annual income of $23,373. See Medicaid Income and Resource
Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/07_lncomeandResourceGuidelines.asp (last visited Apr.
20, 2011); Income Thresholds for Jobless and Working Parents Applying for Medicaid by Annual
Income as a Percent of Federal Poverty Level (FPL), 2009, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=205&cat-4 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). Note that
the Affordable Care Act will increase Medicaid eligibility to 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Level
beginning in 2014. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
123. Jost, supra note 15, at 540.
124. See DENAVAS-WALT, PROCTOR & SMITH, supra note 4, at 23 tbl.8.
125. Cathy Schoen, Jennifer L. Nicholson & Sheila D. Rustgi, Paying the Price: How Health
Insurance Premiums Are Eating Up Middle-Class Incomes, COMMONWEALTH FUND, Aug. 20, 2009, at
3 fig.1, available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/ media/Files/Publications/Data%20
Brief/2009/Aug/1313_Schoenpayingtheyprice db v3_resorted tables.pdf.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 426(a)(1) (2006).
127. See generally Rtichard L. Kaplan, Nicholas J. Powers & Jordan Zucker, Retirees at Risk: The
Precarious Promise ofPost-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 287
(2009) (examining health insurance in retirement, a source of retirement anxiety that has not received as
much attention as Social Security).
128. Id. at 342-54.
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insurance. 129
Evidence suggests that foreign hospitals often perform surgeries
required by older populations, such as knee and hip replacements and
various forms of heart surgery.' 30 Moreover, even those covered by
Medicare increasingly demand surgery overseas, particularly in Mexico.' '
Thus, foreign providers appeal to precisely those patients that have fallen
through the cracks in our safety net, often because the providers tend to
offer more expensive and specialized services than those offered by local
safety net providers.
Foreign providers have also become attractive to insured patients.
Increasingly, insurers are offering "consumer directed health plans" that
require patients to bear higher premiums and deductibles, under the theory
that patients will better utilize care when spending their own money.132
Industry watchers speculate that as more insurers offer such plans-which
often require patients to spend upwards of $5000-$10,000 out-of-pocket-
more patients will try to save money by using foreign providers.'3 3 For
example, many patients already travel for dental procedures precisely
because dental plans often require high out-of-pocket cost sharing.134
Along these lines, insured patients also utilize foreign providers when their
domestic policies do not cover certain procedures. Foreign providers are
already popular for "dental care and cosmetic surgery because few have
health insurance that covers those services."135
Evidence also suggests that U.S. patients are becoming less reluctant
to seek care overseas. A 2006 survey showed that 10-35 percent of U.S.
residents polled who had a sick family member would be willing to travel
129. Robert Pear, Some Retirees Will Receive Aid to Pay Health Bills, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2010,
at A14.
130. Shawn Rhea, Still Packing Their Bags; Health Reform Won't Drastically Alter the
Economics of Medical Tourism, but Patients and Providers Can Expect New Opportunities, At Home
and Abroad, 39 MOD. HEALTHCARE 28, 29 (2009).
131. LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, MEDICARE IN MEXICO: INNOVATING FOR
FAIRNESS AND COST SAVINGS, Policy Research Project Report No. 156, at 12 (David C. Warner,
Project Dir., 2007), available at http://www.utexas.edullbj/chasp/publications/downloads/Warner_
Medicare in_ Mexico.pdf.
132. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-
DRIVEN MOVEMENT 133-38 (2007).
133. Murphy, supra note 119; DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 119, at 4-5
(noting that higher cost-sharing and responsibility for managing health savings accounts might
encourage discount shopping).
134. Murphy, supra note 119 (noting that under a plan offered by BlueCross BlueShield of South
Carolina, a patient paid $2800 for a dental procedure in Costa Rica instead of the $10,000 it would have
cost in the United States).
135. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1480 n.45.
880 [Vol. 84:859
2011] EMBRACING THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF HEALTH CARE
overseas for major, nonemergency surgery, depending on how much they
could save. 136 And a 2009 poll of 5050 U.S. adults showed that 29 percent
would consider going abroad for a "major medical problem," with the
percentage rising to 40 percent assuming "equal quality and significantly
cheaper cost."1 37
Finally, immigrants living in the United States increasingly rely on
foreign providers, particularly those in Mexico, Costa Rica, and other Latin
American countries.' 38 Researchers estimate that, during one year, 952,000
California residents traveled to Mexico for medical care, dental care, or
prescription drugs, roughly half of whom were Mexican immigrants. 139
Providers in Mexico have long attracted U.S. residents,140 not only because
they offer an economical alternative for uninsured, low-income
populations, and patients who prefer Spanish-speaking providers,141 but
also because they are much closer to the United States than providers in
Asia. 142
Foreign providers often fill a unique gap in our safety net. Most of the
136. Arnold Milstein & Mark Smith, Will the Surgical World Become Flat?, 26 HEALTH AFF.
137, 138-40 (2007). The survey posed the following question to 148 households with "sicker" family
members:
How much savings do you think would cause the sicker person (in your household) to agree
to obtain major, nonemergency surgery at a very good hospital outside the United States (for
example, in Thailand, India, or Mexico) by a good surgeon who was trained in the United
States, England, or Canada and speaks English or the patient's language?
Id at 140.
137. Christopher Khoury, Americans Consider Crossing Borders for Medical Care, GALLUP
(May 18, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/118423/americans-consider-crossing-borders-medical-
care.aspx. Unsurprisingly, Gallup found that respondents lacking health insurance were more willing to
travel overseas than those with insurance. Id.
138. Ian Youngman, Where Do American Medical Tourists Go Abroad for Treatment?, INT'L
MED. TRAVEL J. (2009), http://www.imtjonline.com/articles/2009/where-do-americans-go-abroad.
139. Steven P. Wallace, Carolyn Mendez-Luck & X6chitl Castafieda, Heading South: Why
Mexican Immigrants in California Seek Health Services in Mexico, 47 MED. CARE 662, 662 (2009)
(using California Health Interview Survey data from 2001).
140. MILICA Z. BOOKMAN & KARLA R. BOOKMAN, MEDICAL TOURISM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 49 (2007); Niria Homedes & Antonio Ugalde, Globalization and Health at the United
States-Mexico Border, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2016, 2016-17 (2003); Alfredo Corchado & Laurence
Iliff, Good Care, Low Prices Lure Patients to Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 28, 2007, at IA
(describing the emerging trend of U.S. residents traveling to Mexico for medical services).
141. Cortez, supra note 112, at 101; MARISSA PAULA WALKER & ROBERT GUERRERO, ARIZONA-
MEXICO COMM'N, CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE INITIATIVES IN CALIFORNIA, TEXAS AND
ARIZONA 5, 8 (2003), available at http://econdev.web.arizona.edulpubs/az-mexico/pubs/Cross-Border
Insurance.pdf.
142. See BOOKMAN & BOoKMAN, supra note 140, at 58 (noting that proximity is an important
factor for elderly and ill patients traveling from the United States and Canada to Mexico); Corchado &
Iliff, supra note 140 (noting that basic surgical procedures are 40 percent less expensive in Mexico than
in the United States); Kelly Arthur Garrett, Prices of Medical Services Are at Least 30% Lower in
Mexico than in US., EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), Dec. 27, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 14869899.
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un- and underinsured can access at least some level of basic services in the
United States, but this population often does not have reliable access to
"specialists, inpatient care, high-tech procedures, or a regimen of
prescription drugs." 43 These are precisely the products and services that
patients seek in foreign countries.
B. INSURER OUTSOURCING
Insurers are the second major constituent of our health care system
now experimenting with low-cost foreign providers. Employers and third-
party insurers of all sizes are garnering national media attention for
outsourcing expensive surgeries, adding foreign providers to their
networks, or for creating true cross-border plans.144 These companies seem
to be driven by one of two motivations-the need to cut spending and
preserve health benefits for existing beneficiaries, or the desire to market
new insurance products to populations that cannot afford traditional private
insurance.
The four largest commercial insurers in the United States
(UnitedHealth, WellPoint, Aetna, and Humana) have either introduced
medical tourism pilot programs or are considering it.145 Moreover,
BlueCross BlueShield of South Carolina contracted with a hospital in
Bangkok, Thailand to perform certain surgeries,146 and Cigna published a
podcast on the topic.147
In general, smaller employers and insurers have been even more
adventurous experimenting with foreign providers. For example, around
two hundred U.S. employers offer a network of foreign providers through
BasicPlus Health Insurance, which sells group plans and contracts with
143. Brown, supra note 86, at 326.
144. See, e.g., Janet Fullwood, Booming Trend is Standard Operating Procedure, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 2, 2008, at J4 (discussing BlueCross BlueShield of South Carolina); Roni Caryn Rabin,
Insurer Offers Option for Surgery in India, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l1/21/health/21 abroad.html (discussing Wellpoint).
145. Murphy, supra note 119; Fortune 500 2010: Industry: Health Care: Insurance and Managed
Care, FORTUNE, May 3, 2010, available at http://money.cnn.conmagazines/fortune/fortune500/2010/
industries/223/index.html.
146. BlueCross BlueShield and BlueChoice HealthPlan Pioneer Global Healthcare Alternative,
Bus. WIRE, Feb. 8, 2007, available at http://www.businesswire.con/news/home/20070208005660/
en/BlueCross-BlueShield-BlueChoice-HealthPlan-Pioneer-Global-Healthcare. BlueCross BlueShield
has also negotiated with hospitals in Costa Rica and other countries. Bruce Einhorn, Medical Travel is
Going to Be Part of the Solution, BLOOMBERG Bus. WK., Mar. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2008/ gb20080312_835774.htm.
147. Cigna International Expatriate Benefits Podcast Library, Medical Tourism, CIGNA,
http://cignaexpats.com/producer-resources/podcasts/MedicalTourism.mp3.
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medical tourism facilitator Companion Global Healthcare.148 As of 2006,
United Group Programs, a third-party insurance administrator, had
contracted to outsource surgeries for at least forty U.S. companies.149 Blue
Ridge Paper Products, a self-insured company in North Carolina, generated
national media attention in 2006 when it contracted to send patients to
India for certain surgeries.15 0 And in 2008, the New England grocery store
chain Hannaford Brothers contracted with Aetna to outsource knee and hip
surgeries to Singapore, although it has yet to send anyone overseas. 51
These smaller insurers have been particularly hard-pressed to cut health
expenses, so we might view outsourcing along with high-deductible plans
and health savings accounts as one more effort to preserve benefits in an
increasingly expensive health care system.
Finally, some insurers are experimenting with true cross-border plans
that rely more heavily on foreign providers. For example, health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs") in California like Health Net, Blue
Shield, and Mexican-insurer SIMNSA offer plans to California residents
willing to be treated in Mexico.1 52 These plans generally cost 40-50
148. Ian Youngman, What Happened to Those 2008 Medical Tourism Forecasts?, INT'L MED.
TRAVEL J. (2009), http://www.imtjonline.com/articles/2009/what-happened-to-those-2008-medical-
tourism-forecasts-30002; Press Release, Companion Global Healthcare, Inc., Insurance Company
Global Network Option in Limited Benefit Plans (June 4, 2008), available at
http://www.companionglobalhealthcare.com/news.aspx?article=36.
149. Joe Cochrane, Medical Meccas: Beyond the Beaches, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Oct. 30, 2006, at 1.
150. Senate Hearing, supra note 113, at 29-32 (oral testimony of Bonnie Grissom Blackley,
Corporate Benefits Director, Blue Ridge Paper Products Inc.). Nevertheless, Blue Ridge Paper Products
canceled plans to send one of its employees to India after protests by the United Steelworkers Union.
Saritha Rai, Union Disrupts Plan to Send Ailing Workers to India for Cheaper Medical Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2006, at C6.
151. Youngman, supra note 148. Some believe Hannaford's experience is instructive-local
providers have responded to price competition from abroad. Id. (noting that domestic hospitals are
"offering discounted packages to counter the foreign competition"); Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated
Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tourism and Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
421, 462 (2007) ("Western insurers and policymakers likely will use the threat of overseas fulfillment
as a bargaining tool with domestic health care providers."). See also H.B. 2841, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 2007) (proposing a bill to incentivize public employees in West Virginia to utilize Joint
Commission International-accredited hospitals overseas); H.B. 4711, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
2006) (same); H.B. 4359, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006) (same); Kris Wise, Bill Would Cover
Surgeries Outside U.S., CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), Feb. 3, 2006, at 7A.
Indeed, industry watchers are now observing increased "intra-bound" medical tourism within the
United States. Joanne Wojcik, Employers Consider Short-Haul Medical Tourism, BUS. INS., Aug. 24,
2009, at I (noting that some domestic providers charge up to 75 percent less than local prices because
they receive compensation up front and negotiate on a case-by-case basis); Ian Youngman, The Hottest
Medical Tourism Location for Americans Traveling for Treatment, INT'L MED. TRAVEL J. (2009),
http://www.imtjonline.com/articles/2009/location-for-americans-travelling-for-treatment.
152. Policy Research Project on Cross-Border Health Insurance has published a comprehensive
analysis of these plans. CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32. See
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percent less than those that utilize U.S. providers only,153 and therefore
attract immigrants and potentially other populations that might otherwise
rely on safety net providers. In Part IV, I argue that we can use precisely
this type of cross-border insurance to help cover these populations and
patch the holes in our domestic safety net.
C. MEDICAL REPATRIATION
Foreign providers have become a perverse form of safety net for
several U.S. hospitals that are sending suspected immigrant patients back to
their countries of origin. This phenomenon has been coined "medical
repatriation," but has also been referred to more pejoratively as
"international patient dumping" and even "medical rendition."15 4 Media
reports suggest that U.S. hospitals repatriate hundreds of suspected
immigrants each year to countries like Mexico, Guatemala, China,
Lithuania, and Poland.155
In the typical scenario, an immigrant presents to an emergency room
in serious condition.156 The hospital screens and stabilizes the patient
regardless of his or her immigration status, as required by the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA").157 Some patients,
however, require long-term care that the hospital is not equipped to
provide, such as neurological rehabilitation, around-the-clock nursing care,
or perhaps simply ongoing kidney dialysis.158 Thus, the hospital begins
searching for a nursing home, rehab center, or other long-term care
facility-or even a family member or charity-that is willing to care for the
patient. 59 But often no family is present in the United States, and long-
term care facilities are usually reluctant to accept uninsured immigrants
who do not qualify for Medicaid or other programs that might reimburse at
least part of their expenses.160 Thus, left with potentially massive
also Cortez, supra note 112, at 99-100; Ly Tran, Note, Sick and Tired of the Knox-Keene Act: The
Equal Protection Right of Non-Mexican Cahfornians to Enroll in Mexico-Based HMO Plans, 14 SW. J.
L. & TRADE AM. 357, 357-63 (2008).
153. Tran, supra note 152, at 358; Sonya Geis, Passport to Health Care at Lower Cost to Patient;
California HMOs Send Some Enrollees to Mexico, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A03.
154. Sontag, supra note 31.
155. Id; Joseph Wolpin, Medical Repatriation ofAlien Patients, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 152
(2009); Deborah Sontag, Deported in Coma, Saved Back in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al.
156. Sontag, supra note 31; Sontag, supra note 155.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). See supra note 90 for a brief description of EMTALA.
158. Sontag, supra note 31.
159. Id.
160. Wolpin, supra note 155, at 152-53. Note that Medicaid does pay hospitals treating
immigrants for emergencies, but does not cover all expenses or extend beyond emergency treatment.
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uncompensated expenses, the hospital takes the dramatic step of arranging
with a commercial airline service or ambulance to transport the patient
back to his or her suspected country of origin.161 The most highly
publicized case to date followed precisely this pattern. 162 But its path
through the legal system failed to clarify the legal boundaries of this
practice and what, if any, legal rights patients or their families might
exercise.163
As with medical tourism and other cross-border health trends, no
government entities track medical repatriation and no federal or state laws
seem to address it. Thus, medical repatriation has been incubated in a legal
void, outside the purview of regulators or oversight mechanisms that might
Section 1011 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 allotted
$250 million for treating immigrants, but it expired in 2008. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1011, 117 Stat. 2066, 2432 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd). Proposed legislation to extend these payments to 2012 has stalled. See
Border Health Care Relief Act of 2009, H.R. 1639, 11Ith Cong. (2009) (referred to the Committee on
Energy and Commerce).
161. Sontag, supra note 31. California company MexCare helps U.S. hospitals repatriate unfiinded
Latin American nationals to a "network of over 50 hospitals, dialysis treatment centers, and physicians
in Latin America." Services, About Us, MEXCARE, http://mexcare.com/services-mexcare.html (last
visited Apr. 20, 2011). MexCare calls itself the 'liaison' between the American and the Latin
American healthcare systems," id. (follow "Procedures" hyperlink), but contracts only with private
hospitals in foreign countries, see Press Release, MexCare, The New York Times Gets It Wrong! (Aug.
15, 2008), available at http://mexcare.com/press-release-mexcare.html.
162. In 2000, Luis Alberto Jim6nez, a gardener from Guatemala, suffered traumatic brain damage
while riding in a car struck by a drunk driver in Florida. Jim6nez was treated by Martin Memorial
Hospital, which spent $1.5 million caring for him over several years, only $80,000 of which was
reimbursed by Medicaid. Unable to find a rehabilitation center that would accept him, the hospital
intervened in his guardianship hearing and obtained a court order allowing the hospital to transfer him
to a facility in Guatemala. Jim6nez's guardian appealed the ruling and attempted to stay the transfer.
But before the district court could rule on the stay, Martin Memorial spent $30,000 for an air ambulance
and transported Jiminez to Guatemala's sole public rehabilitation hospital, which does not provide
services to rehabilitate traumatic brain injuries. Montejo ex rel. Jimenez v. Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 874 So. 2d 654, 655-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Sontag, supra note 31.
163. In 2004, a Florida appeals court invalidated the district court's order, noting that there were
Medicare and the hospital's own discharge rules requiring the hospital to demonstrate that the facility in
Guatemala could meet Jim6nez's medical needs, and finding that "there was no substantial competent
evidence to support" his discharge. Montejo, 874 So. 2d at 657-58. See also 42 C.F.R. § 482.21(b)(2);
59 Fed. Reg. 64,149 (1994). The court also noted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
effectively deport Jimdnez because only the federal government can order deportations. Montejo, 874
So. 2d at 656-58. But by this time, Jim6nez had already been transferred from the rehabilitation hospital
in Guatemala, and was being cared for in a one-room house by his elderly mother, where he received
"no medical care or medication." Sontag, supra note 31. In 2006, the Florida appeals court allowed
Jiminez's guardian to proceed with a claim that transporting Jimdnez to Guatemala constituted false
imprisonment. Montejo ex rel. Jimenez v. Martin Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 935 So. 2d 1266, 1272 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006). The jury, however, rejected this claim. Melissa E. Holsman, Jury Finds for Martin
Memorial in Immigrant's Deportation Case, TCPALM (July 27, 2009), http://www.tcpalm.com/news/
2009/jul/27/jury-favor-martin-memorial-immigrant-deportation-c.
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protect patients. The practice has generated a slew of controversy, ranging
from litigation to media scrutiny to investigations by medical societies.164
In 2008, the California Medical Association denounced the practice, and
the American Medical Association ("AMA") commissioned a study to
examine it.'6 5 Some call medical repatriation "inhumane" or even a "death
sentence."1 66
How did we get here? The cumulative flaws of our health care and
immigration systems have combined to create "a de facto regulatory
framework" in which hospitals find it necessary and even prudent to
repatriate immigrant patients.'6 7 On the health side, EMTALA requires
hospitals to provide "appropriate" treatment to emergency patients, and
precludes hospitals from transferring them if it would materially deteriorate
their condition.168 Hospitals may only transfer patients to an appropriate
facility "that can meet the patient's medical needs on a post-discharge
basis."' 6 9 The federal government reimburses hospitals for emergency care
provided to immigrants, but some of this funding has expired, and even
with it, the funding was inadequate.' 70 Moreover, federal funding stops
once a hospital stabilizes the patient.171 Thus, the federal government does
164. Wolpin, supra note 155, at 152-55.
165. California Medical Association House of Delegates, Adopted Res. 105a-08, Forced
Deportation ofPatients (2008); American Medical Association House of Delegates, Proposed Res. 4 (I-
08), Forced Repatriation of Immigrants by Hospitals 89-95 (2008), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/38/i-09-ceja-reports.pdf
166. Sontag, supra note 31. Other countries are not immune. In the United Kingdom, The Lancet
called the deportation of a Ghanaian woman who later died of cancer an "atrocious barbarism."
Editorial, Migrant Health: What Are Doctors'Leaders Doing?, 371 LANCET 178, 178 (2008).
167. Wolpin, supra note 155, at 152.
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395dd(a), (e)(3)(A) (2006).
169. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Revisions to Conditions of Participation for Hospitals, 59
Fed. Reg. 64,141, 64,149 (Dec. 13, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405-82); 42 C.F.R. § 482.43
(2010).
170. Kit Johnson, Patients Without Borders: Extralegal Deportation by Hospitals, 78 U. CIN. L.
REv. 657, 662 (2009) (noting that the University of California San Diego Trauma Center spends on
average $18,000 treating each migrant injured by the border fence, but is reimbursed only $4000 by the
federal government).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-7(f) (requiring that immigrants, regardless of their immigration status, are
not cut off from receiving medical care for "emergency medical condition[s]"). See also id § 1320b-
7(d). Note, however, that courts have interpreted this provision differently. See, e.g., Greenery Rehab.
Grp., Inc. v. Hammon, 150 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that when the patient was stabilized, the
emergency medical condition had ended); Scottsdale Healthcare, Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost
Containment Syst. Admin., 75 P.3d 91, 98 (Ariz. 2003) ("[T]he focus must be on whether the patient's
current medical condition-whether it is the initial injury that led to admission, a condition directly
resulting from that injury, or a wholly separate condition-is a non-chronic condition presently
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity that the absence of immediate medical
treatment could result in one of the three adverse consequences listed in [the statute]."); Szewczyk v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259 (Conn. 2005) (holding that the stabilization of an injury is not
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not reimburse long-term care expenses for immigrants, which can leave
hospitals caring for immigrants with long-term needs indefinitely.172
On the immigration side, our immigration laws make it extremely
difficult for immigrants to access care. Unauthorized immigrants are not
eligible for most public programs,173 and in 1996, Congress made even
authorized immigrants ineligible for Medicaid and CHIP for at least five
years after entering the United States-which often extends to ten years
due to the vagaries of immigration law.174 Moreover, very few immigrants
have a realistic path to legal residency that would increase their chance of
receiving public or private health benefits.
Thus, the intersection of our health care and immigration laws has
created a gaping hole in the safety net by excluding most immigrants from
public, means-tested health insurance programs. And out of some
combination of opportunism, necessity, and desperation, U.S. patients,
insurers, and even hospitals now rely to varying degrees on low-cost
foreign providers. Foreign providers have become a safety net for our
health care system.
IV. IS CROSS-BORDER INSURANCE THE ANSWER?
Can foreign medical providers compensate for the deficiencies of our
domestic system? Can they offer an affordable alternative for those who
remain uninsured after health reform? And can we ensure that cross-border
plans do not devolve into junk plans that offer poor coverage and low
quality care to marginalized populations?
This part proposes how providers can accomplish each, pivoting on
the following three elements. First, we should allow health insurers to
experiment with cross-border plans that actually appeal to those who are
not offered and cannot afford traditional insurance. Second, states should
create a very basic legal framework that resolves various legal and
logistical ambiguities, and ensures that cross-border plans meet minimum
quality and financial criteria. And third, I argue in Part V that because
dispositive as to whether an emergency medical condition still exists); Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628
S.E.2d 1, 5 (N.C. 2006) ("The Second Circuit's analysis in Greenery follows the plain meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1396b, and our holding is consistent with both the statute and Greenery.").
172. Sontag, supra note 31.
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2006) (noting that "aliens" are "not eligible for any Federal public benefit"
except for emergency care under EMTALA, immunizations, and so forth). Note that immigrants do
benefit from public spending given to emergency departments, federally qualified health centers, and
other safety net programs, as noted in supra Part II.C.
174. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1613.
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cross-border care largely resides beyond the purview of domestic
regulators, we should use several tools of new governance to regulate both
the cross-border insurance market and the quality of care offered in it. Parts
IV and V thus outline the proposal, examine its legal and regulatory
mechanics, and offer both theoretical and doctrinal support.
A. UNFORTUNATE REALITIES
Although cross-border insurance is a relatively novel and feasible way
to insure those left out of reform, I emphasize that it is not the ideal
solution. Two unfortunate realities animate this proposal. First, despite
landmark health reform in 2010, the Affordable Care Act will leave
twenty-three million without insurance after ten years, and roughly fifty
million more will remain uninsured until several major provisions take
effect in 2014." The second reality is that very few expect these reforms
to markedly lower the cost of medical care,1 76 particularly to prices that
might diminish the appeal of foreign providers. In short, health reform will
not cover everyone and will not eliminate foreign providers as an
economical alternative. As others trying to tackle the problem of the
postreform uninsured have noted, the perfect should not be the enemy of
the good.'77
As such, cross-border insurance represents a unique chance to expand
coverage to two very different uninsured populations-immigrants and the
nonimmigrant middle class. As explained above, cross-border insurance
should appeal to immigrants who are less likely to be offered public or
private insurance and who generally struggle to access care. Health reform
does not pretend to insure unauthorized immigrants, and, in fact, the law
goes out of its way to exclude them from receiving federal support. Cross-
border insurance not only would appeal to this population, but also would
incorporate the growing network of foreign providers that more and more
immigrants already use for care. 17 8 These plans would also be economical,
as cross-border plans in California are estimated to be 25-60 percent less
expensive than plans that utilize only domestic providers. 7 9
175. CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 9, app. tbl.4.
176. The reforms in the Affordable Care Act that might reduce the costs of medical care are
several years from being fully implemented and scaled up.
177. Hall, supra note 13, at 10.
178. CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at xix (noting that
there has long been "a large and thriving informal market for dental, vision, and medical services"
along the U.S.-Mexico border).
179. See Rachel C. Maguire, SIMNSA and Salud con Health Net, in CROSS-BORDER HEALTH
INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at 49, 57 (citing estimates from SIMNSA); Phillip
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Cross-border insurance may also offer a low-cost alternative to
nonimmigrant middle class patients who must now obtain insurance under
the individual mandate but might be unable to afford it. As noted above,
many un- and underinsured are too young for Medicare and earn too much
for Medicaid. 8 0 Some middle-class patients may not be offered health
insurance by employers because they work in temporary or part-time jobs,
or for small employers, or in certain industries that do not offer health
insurance. 18 1 Although health reform now requires these employers to
"play or pay"-to offer creditable coverage or pay a fee-smaller
employers and employers who employ low-wage workers are expected to
"pay," and eight to nine million people are expected to lose employer-
sponsored insurance. 182
Moreover, individual policies may still be too expensive after health
reform, despite cost-sharing subsidies, premium tax credits, and other
stopgap measures designed to reduce costs. Though most observers have
been reluctant to endorse foreign providers as a solution for the
uninsuredt 8 3 cross-border insurance provides a distinct opportunity to craft
a low-cost option that appeals precisely to these populations. In fact, as
noted above, some nonimmigrant middle class patients are already
gravitating toward foreign providers. Thus, cross-border insurance may be
one of the more economical ways to cover patients who remain uninsured
after reform.
B. CREATING A BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Most states will need to create a basic legal framework to encourage
cross-border insurance. This framework should (1) explicitly authorize
state-licensed insurers to utilize foreign providers, eliminating any legal
ambiguities that might be interpreted to prohibit or deter it; (2) give
companies flexibility in designing such plans; (3) specify any minimum
coverage requirements; (4) encourage regulatory proxies that ensure quality
care; and (5) address other hurdles that discourage cross-border insurance,
Savio, Blue Shield Access Baja, in CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra
note 32, at 35, 41 (citing estimates from Blue Shield's Access Baja plan); Kelly Shanahan, Western
Growers Association, in CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at
67, 73-74 (citing estimates from the Western Growers Association ("WGA")). Although California law
requires that enrollees be legally present and employed in the United States, there is evidence that
undocumented immigrants enroll in some of these plans. Maguire, supra, at 57.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 121-29.
181. Jost, supra note 15, at 540-41.
182. CBO Letter, supra note 3, at 10.
183. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1525-26; Cortez, supra note I12, at 121.
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such as legal recourse for malpractice committed abroad.
The idea of cross-border insurance is not entirely new, and my
proposal necessarily builds on earlier ones. For example, California
demonstrates how states can regulate cross-border plans by requiring them
to maintain a state license and consent to California law and jurisdiction.' 84
The dozen or so insurers that have added foreign providers to their
networks show how insurers can leverage network access to encourage
quality care. The California-Mexico Health Initiative's "Strategy for
Binational Health Insurance" shows how plans could cover preventative
and ambulatory care in the United States and Mexico while requiring
hospitalization in Mexico.' 85 Economists have demonstrated that portable
health insurance can be cost effective even when paying for travel costs. 186
Eleanor Kinney has proposed that North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") countries use portable health insurance to protect individuals
traveling as a result of economic integration.' 8 ' And Europe's experience in
this area demonstrates how states can confront their limited jurisdiction
over cross-border care.' 8 8 In addition to the legal scholars studying medical
tourism, these predecessors have considered how to maximize the benefit-
risk differential when using foreign providers.
Before detailing my proposal, it is worth noting that the only two
states formally to consider cross-border insurance reached opposite
conclusions. California legitimized cross-border health insurance in the late
1990s, amidst concerns that patients were vulnerable in the unregulated
market.18 1 Conversely, after studying cross-border insurance for a few
years, Texas recently banned companies from issuing any insurance policy
that "requires an enrollee to travel to a foreign country" for care,1 90
184. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2 (West 2008) (describing California's
arrangement allowing Mexican prepaid health plans to operate health care service plans in California).
185. CALIFORNIA-MEXICO HEALTH INITIATIVE, PROPOSED CALIFORNIA STRATEGY FOR
BINATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE I [hereinafter CMHI], available at http://www.ucop.edu/cmhi/
documents/binationalinsurpro.pdf.
186. Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 111, at 361-62. See also CMHI, supra note 185, at 1.
187. Eleanor D. Kinney, Health Care Financing and Delivery in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada: Establishing Intentional Principles for Sound Integration, 26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 934, 963 (2008).
188. See generally Wolf Sauter, The Proposed Patient Mobility Directive and the Reform of
Cross-Border Healthcare in the EU (Tilberg L. & Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2008-034, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-12771 10 (discussing the European Commission's Proposal for a
Directive on patients' rights in cross-border health care).
189. 1998 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1025 (S.B. No. 1658) (West) (codified as amended at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1345, 1351.2); CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR
TEXAS, supra note 32, at xix.
190. S.B. No. 1391, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) (codified at TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1215
(West 2009), amended as § 1216). The statute states that "A health benefit plan issuer may not issue or
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responding to thinly veiled protectionist concerns voiced by Texas
providers. These two laboratories of democracy present two contradictory
precedents. My proposal tries to embrace the innovations in California and
overcome some of the concerns in Texas.
Given these precedents, my proposal calls for states to pass legislation
containing the five basic elements laid out above.
1. Authorizing Cross-Border Plans
State legislatures should begin by explicitly authorizing cross-border
plans and creating exceptions to any statutory or regulatory provisions that
could be interpreted to prohibit them. The statute need not be long or
complex-the authorizing statute in California occupies only one section of
the California Health and Safety Code, stating simply that health plans
operating lawfully in Mexico may sell plans in California after obtaining a
license.191
Authorizing cross-border plans in states like Texas, however, would
be more complicated.192 In addition to the 2007 Texas law that prohibits
cross-border plans,193 the Texas legislature would also have to amend
several laws that functionally preclude HMOs and other plans from
utilizing foreign providers.194 Despite similar complexities in other states, I
recommend that the authorizing legislation be as simple as possible to
ensure compliance' 95 and that insurers be given wide latitude to craft low-
cost plans that actually appeal to the uninsured. Authorizing legislation
offer for sale in this state a health benefit plan that requires an enrollee to travel to a foreign country to
receive a particular health care service under the health benefit plan." TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
art. 1216.004. The legislative history states that this prohibition applies to plans that "require" out-of-
country care or offer a "discount on the amount an enrollee is required to pay to receive a particular
health care service under the plan." S.B. 1391, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess.
191. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2. Note, however, that dozens of other sections of the
Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 also govern these plans. See id §§ 1340-1399. But
California shows how states can authorize cross-border plans without extensive amendments to existing
law.
192. See, e.g., Yacl Cohen & Adam Lenert, Texas Legislation and Regulation, in CROSS-BORDER
HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at 79, 79-90.
193. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1216.
194. See Cohen & Lenert, supra note 192, at 80-83 (describing regulations on HMOs, including
the HMO Act, Chapter 982, and Chapter 3).
195. I borrow this basic tenet from the proposal suggested by Hervey and Trubek to govern cross-
border care in Europe. Hervey & Trubek, supra note I1, at 636 ("The first component would articulate
the formal substantive legal rule in highly abstract and simple terms."). David Zaring also notes that
communicating simple and broadly worded core principles can help proselytize these standards. David
Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547,
580-85 (2005).
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could even specify the ends desired rather than the means to achieve
them,"' for example by requiring plans to ensure that foreign providers
offer medical care of comparable quality to U.S. providers. Finally, the
legislation should require companies offering cross-border plans to be
authorized to sell insurance in that state, which in most states would require
insurers to meet various financial solvency requirements and be subject to
state jurisdiction.' 97
Notably, the new health reform law may allow states to play a more
active role than even my proposal envisions. The Affordable Care Act
allows states to create "alternative programs" for low-income individuals
not eligible for Medicare or Medicaid, in lieu of offering such coverage
through an exchange."' Although the plan must provide "essential health
benefits," 99 the language of the Act does not explicitly prohibit cross-
border plans (although it does not seem to contemplate them either). Note,
however, that states may enroll only "eligible individuals," which excludes
unauthorized immigrants. 200  But the Act explicitly encourages
"innovation," 20' and cross-border plans would certainly supply it.
2. Giving Flexibility to Design Plans
Because we do not yet know what plans will actually appeal to the
uninsured, states should give insurers some flexibility to design plans.
Cross-border plans may be structured as HMO plans, preferred provider
organization ("PPO") plans, self-funded Employment Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA") plans, multiple employer welfare arrangements
("MEWAs," a type of ERISA plan),202 or one of several nontraditional
plans, such as a plan organized through nonprofits like religious
196. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is
Domestic (or, the European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 332 (2006) (noting how "the EU
Council of Ministers and the EU Commission issue directives that specify ends rather than means" and
that this European way of law is how international law should function).
197. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1351.2(a)(3), (6HIO) (West 2008).
198. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1331, 124 Stat. 119,
199-203 (2010).
199. Id § 1302(b)(2), 124 Stat. at 164. Moreover, HHS must certify that plans meet the Act's
benefits requirements under criteria yet to be determined by regulation. Id.
200. Id. § 1331(b)(1), (e)(1)(A), 124 Stat. at 200, 202.
201. Id. § 1331(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. at 200. Section 1332 also provides a "waiver for state
innovation," but it does not apply until 2017. Id. § 1332, 124 Stat. at 203-05.
202. MEWAs are a subset of ERISA plans that are self-funded plans offered by groups of
employers in a bona fide trade, industrial, or professional organization. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(40)(A)
(2006). Notably, self-funded plans and MEWAs are exempt from various provisions in the new health
reform law governing qualified plans offered in state exchanges. Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act § 1301(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 163.
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congregations or even more innovative types of microinsurance. 203 In
California, insurers generally structure their cross-border plans as HMOs
that incorporate providers in Mexico into their networks, although the
Western Growers Association ("WGA") also offers a self-funded ERISA
plan.204
Each design presents its own complexities. Cross-border HMO and
PPO plans would be subject to the most state regulation and thus would
require states to do more carving. For example, some states require that
providers in PPO networks be accessible within certain geographical
distances, and some also limit the financial incentives PPOs use to
distinguish preferred from nonpreferred providers by requiring a cost
differential no greater than 20-25 percent.205 States would have to amend
these requirements to accommodate cross-border plans that typically utilize
providers hundreds or even thousands of miles away, and that typically
offer savings much greater than the current differential. Federal HMO laws
also impose certain accessibility requirements that may implicate cross-
border arrangements. 206 The benefit of using an HMO design is that
insurers could use primary care gatekeepers in the United States to ensure
that care overseas is medically appropriate. By contrast, self-funded ERISA
plans are subject to minimal, if any, state regulation and thus offer not only
more flexibility, but also substantially lower rates. 207 Finally, plans of most
forms can simply attach riders that cover care in foreign countries, as the
203. E.g., Adam Lenert & Kelly Shanahan, Conclusions, in CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE:
OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at 238, 246-47 (describing proposals for nontraditional plans in
Texas). See also David M. Dror et al., Microinsurance: Innovations in Low-Cost Health Insurance, 28
HEALTH AFF. 1788, 1788, 1797 (2009) (discussing how low-cost health insurance based on community,
cooperative, or other self-help arrangements in India have fared). The California-Mexico Health
Initiative's proposal calls for binational insurance offered through employers, or via Mexican
hometown associations consisting of migrants from the same towns in Mexico. CMHI, supra note 185,
at 2.
204. See Maguire, supra note 179, at 58-59 (discussing how Salud con Health Net incorporates
providers in Mexico into HMO plans in fifteen states across the U.S.); Savio, supra note 179, at 36-38
(discussing the incorporation of providers in Mexico and California HMOs); Shanahan, supra note 179,
at 67-70 (discussing health insurance packages offered by the WGA); CROSS-BORDER HEALTH
INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at xxi (discussing the WGA).
205. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1563 (discussing PPO statutes that "establish maximum fixed
disparities in co-pays").
206. Id. at 1557 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e(b)(4), (c)(6) (2006)).
207. Adam Lenert & Yael Cohen, California Legislation and Regulation, in CROSS-BORDER
HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at 19, 28; Lenert & Shanahan, supra note
203, at 246. Note, however, that states do impose some requirements on ERISA plans. For example,
California requires ERISA plans to be certified by the state, and they are subject to state regulatory
standards consistent with ERISA. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 742.20-742.43 (West 2005).
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WGA does.208
Regardless of the design, I recommend that most plans contract with
both domestic and foreign providers, creating a de facto cross-border
provider network. 20 9 The bottom line is that states should grant insurers
latitude to design low-cost plans that actually appeal to the uninsured.210
3. Specifying Minimum Coverage Requirements
States should also enumerate minimum coverage requirements for
cross-border plans, which will require states to consider both routine and
novel questions. States routinely decide what should be covered by
imposing mandates that require insurers to cover certain tests or
procedures. 21 1 But most states have never considered where these benefits
should be provided, or whether insurers may incentivize or even require
beneficiaries to seek care in another country.
On the first question-what should be covered-states should give
insurers flexibility to deviate from state-mandated coverage minimums so
long as they clearly disclose and explain such deviations. Cross-border
plans might cover (1) only basic, primary care; (2) only catastrophic care;
or (3) some combination of primary, specialty, and catastrophic care.212
States should consider whether to require coverage for emergency and
urgent care, though I generally recommend that they do. On the one hand,
plans that cover only emergency care would likely cover such care in the
United States, which could undermine the financial rationale of cross-
border plans-California insurers have expressed concern that
nonimmigrants are purchasing cross-border plans solely to cover
emergency care in the United States, with no intention of seeking care in
Mexico. 213 On the other hand, plans that do not cover emergency or urgent
208. Shanahan, supra note 179, at 70-74 (discussing an optional rider program known as the
"Mexico Panel").
209. These are sometimes called "dual networks" because they include both domestic and foreign
providers. Maguire, supra note 179, at 49.
210. States can tinker with the requirements that apply to each design, for example by requiring
more protections for patients in cross-border HMO plans or mandatory plans. For a discussion on how
to tailor requirements to plans, see Cohen, supra note 16, at 1556-59 (suggesting HMO models are
more worrisome than PPO models).
211. Id at 1557.
212. See Cesar Martinez, Luis de la Mora & Laura Spagnolo, Dallas-Fort Worth Area Case Study,
in CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at 197, 205.
213. Maguire, supra note 179, at 54; Savio, supra note 179, at 39-40. Additionally, states should
consider the criteria for transferring emergency or urgent care patients to foreign hospitals. Mexican
citizens might be covered by catastrophic health insurance coverage for tertiary services in Mexico, as
requested by former President Vicente Fox in 2004. CMHI, supra note 185, at 2 (quoting former
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care in the United States would not address the medical repatriation
problem. For example, the California-Mexico Health Initiative's proposal
does not specify coverage for emergency care, and anticipates that
hospitalization "will continue to be provided through the existing safety net
system in California." 214 It would be difficult, however, to justify not
covering domestic emergency and urgent care as a normative matter.215
Another wrinkle is that states should give insurers flexibility to cover
travel expenses, particularly to regions like Southeast Asia for which travel
expenses are high but provider discounts are even higher.216
Finally, to rebut concerns that cross-border plans will be coercive, or
will crowd out plans that utilize only domestic providers, states might
consider requiring that if employers offer cross-border plans, they must
also offer at least one domestic plan that meets state-mandated coverage
*21
requirements.217 Even if price differentials are so high that the choice is
illusory, the price differentials may pressure domestic providers to compete
for patients and lower their rates.
On the second question-where should care be provided-states
should require plans to cover emergency care in the United States. For
example, California law requires that cross-border plans cover emergency
and urgent care in California, and that all other care must be provided in
Mexico. 218 The cross-border plans in California seem to ignore the latter
requirement. Blue Shield's plan offers most services in Mexico but reserves
some for California due to "lack of necessary facilities" and other "cultural
standards" in Mexico.219 Health Net's plans allow the insured to choose
between receiving services primarily, but not exclusively, in the Los
President Vicente Fox during Binational Health Week, Oct. 11, 2004).
214. CMHI, supra note 185, at 1.
215. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1560.
216. See Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 11, at 361-63; CMHI, supra note 185, at I (proposing
that binational plans cover transportation costs to Mexican facilities).
217. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1549.
218. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2(a)(2), (4) (West 2008). See also Cohen & Lenert,
supra note 192, at 85 (describing a proposed cross-border health care bill that would require emergency
care coverage to extend to Texas and other U.S. states); Maguire, supra note 179, at 50, 52-53
(describing how the licensed plans in California divide emergency, urgent, primary, and specialty care
between U.S. and Mexican providers).
219. CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at xx. Blue Shield
relies on General de Salud to manage its provider network in Mexico, which includes three Mexican
hospitals. General de Salud contracts directly with physicians and ensures their credentials and the
quality of care they provide, and receives a capitated payment from Blue Shield based on the number of
customers served, reimbursing Mexican providers directly. The Blue Shield Access Baja plan operates
like an HMO, with primary care gatekeepers needed for referrals to specialists. Savio, supra note 179,
at 36-42.
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Angeles or Mexico service areas.220 The WGA also uses a network of
primary and specialty providers in both countries. 221 Only SIMNSA
provides all but emergency and urgent care in Mexico. 222 States could
decide whether primary, urgent, and specialty care must be provided
domestically or abroad, or states could simply leave these decisions to
insurers, given that we do not yet know which combinations will appeal to
the uninsured. Other insurers around the country have designed plans that
simply outsource a menu of high-cost individual procedures that are
conducive to travel.223 Again, states should grant insurers some flexibility
to identify plans that will actually appeal to the uninsured.
States may also wish to confront the extent to which insurers should
be able to encourage or even require beneficiaries to seek care overseas. As
220. Salud con Health Net is a "binational partnership between Health Net, Hispanic Physicians,
Tenet HealthSystems in LA county, and SIMNSA in Mexico." Maguire, supra note 179, at 58. Health
Net contracts with U.S. providers who agree to lower reimbursement rates to be included in the
network. Health Net offers a full-network plan with access to Health Net's broad network in California,
and a narrow-network plan that limits access to eight hospitals in Mexico (including SIMNSA's
network) and seven in Los Angeles county. Id. at 58-59; SALUD CON HEALTH NET,
http://www.saludconhealthnet.com (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
221. The WGA draws members from agricultural businesses in California and Arizona. Beginning
in 1972, it began offering optional cross-border care through self-funded ERISA MEWAs, aimed
primarily at seasonal migrant workers, utilizing an extensive provider network in Mexico that now
includes at least ninety specialist providers and ten hospitals. The WGA contracts directly with doctors,
clinics, hospitals, and pharmacies in Mexico, and contracts with several U.S. insurers for care in the
United States. The WGA offers traditional indemnity and HMO and PPO plans, to which an additional
cross-border "Mexico Panel" rider can be attached. As an ERISA MEWA that does not offer
precapitated HMO plans, the WGA plans are regulated primarily by the U.S. Department of Labor
rather than the California Department of Managed Health Care. Shanahan, supra note 179, at 67-71.
See also Health Insurance, WESTERN GROWERS, http://www.wga.com/default.php?id=701 (last visited
Apr. 24, 2011).
222. Maguire, supra note 179, at 50, 53. SIMNSA is a Mexican insurer that operates in California
by contracting with U.S. companies. For example, it contracts with two provider networks (HealthSouth
and the Community Care Network) to offer emergency and urgent care in the United States; it contracts
with International Healthcare Inc. to perform administrative functions; and it reinsures its coverage with
AIG to reduce its financial liabilities. CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra
note 32, at xxi; Maguire, supra note 179, at 50-53.
223. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1515-16; Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 111, at 360-61. For
example, Aaditya Mattoo and Randeep Rathindran choose for price comparison purposes fifteen
medical procedures that (1) treat non-acute conditions, (2) allow patients to travel without major pain or
inconvenience, (3) are fairly simple with low complication rates, (4) require minimal follow-up
treatment on site, (5) generate minimal laboratory and pathology reports, and (6) result in minimal
immobility after the procedure. Procedures that qualified included knee surgery, shoulder arthroplasty,
hernia repair, and glaucoma procedures, among others. New options are emerging. Id For example,
Sekure Healthcare offers a broad provider network in Mexico to employer plans. See Coverage in
Mexico, SEKURE HEALTHCARE, http://www.mysekure.com/incl/Ciudades-de-Mexico2.pdf (last visited
Apr. 24, 2011).
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Glenn Cohen notes, insurers can frame incentives differently.224 For
example, an insurer may provide rebates ex post for using foreign
providers, with domestic providers serving as a more expensive default; a
plan may charge additional copayments ex ante if patients use domestic
instead of foreign providers for certain procedures; or, a plan may simply
require patients to use foreign providers for certain procedures, and refuse
to cover those procedures domestically.225 insurers may conjure up
variations that use positive or negative incentives or both to guide patients
to lower-cost foreign providers.
Again, I recommend that states grant insurers wide latitude to
experiment here. The industry does not yet know which incentive structures
patients will tolerate, and which ones will be cost effective. For example,
cross-border insurers in California worry that they will lose money if
patients can choose U.S. instead of Mexican hospitals.226 Thus, insurers
should be able to offer plans with more aggressive incentives, so long as
they adequately explain where patients must seek care.227 Finally, though
many will undoubtedly bristle at requiring patients to use foreign providers,
it is debatable whether U.S. patients have a normative entitlement to
receive all types of care at all times in the United States.228 This proposal
takes the U.S. health care system as it is, not perhaps as it should be-even
after health reform.
4. Identifying Regulatory Proxies to Ensure Quality Care
Part V describes in detail how we can use principles of new
governance to "regulate" cross-border plans. Briefly, state legislation can
require insurers to use regulatory proxies that ensure quality care overseas.
For example, states can require that cross-border insurers contract only
with foreign physicians that possess credentials equivalent to their U.S.
counterparts, such as maintaining a license to practice and obtaining any
necessary specialty certifications. Similarly, states can require that insurers
utilize only foreign hospitals that are accredited domestically or even by
Joint Commission International ("JCI"). 229 Again, states can be as broad or
224. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1547-50.
225. See id.
226. Cf Jennie Kerr, Stacey Pogue & Kim Tucker, El Paso Case Study, in CROSS-BORDER
HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at 97, 119 (discussing a similar worry of
Texas insurers).
227. Note that states might consider applying laws that cap the cost incentives between network
and nonnetwork providers in PPOs to cross-border plans. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 16, at 1563.
228. Id at 1548-49.
229. See infra notes 287-304 and accompanying text.
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specific as they wish-a simple statutory clause requiring foreign providers
to meet all applicable regulatory criteria in their jurisdictions might suffice,
though more assertive channeling devices are probably warranted here. 230
The benefit of most of these proxies is that they already exist. States need
not regulate from scratch. Indeed, my proposal pivots on the ability of
nongovernmental entities to regulate quality on their own. This is a
hallmark of the new governance framework and something that groups are
already doing, as I discuss below.
5. Addressing Legal Recourse and Other Barriers
Legal uncertainty remains a barrier to cross-border care. The medical
tourism literature examines in detail who might be liable, in which
jurisdictions, and under which legal theories if a U.S. patient is injured by a
foreign provider.231 Rather than rehashing these analyses, I will simply note
that states should say something about liability and jurisdiction in order for
cross-border insurance to succeed. For example, California law requires
cross-border insurers to consent to California law and jurisdiction, and
make grievance procedures available in the United States.232 1 recommend
other states do the same (though other proposals diverge on this point).233
Note, however, that because Mexican providers are independent
contractors under the California plans and may not be subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, it remains unclear whether U.S. residents would have legal
recourse in the United States for malpractice committed in Mexico. 234 The
California plans often ask patients to acknowledge this point.235
Fortunately, states have several options here. Briefly, states may
(1) impose vicarious strict liability on cross-border insurers; (2) require
payors to purchase malpractice or complications insurance; (3) invalidate
230. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1515-23.
231. See, e.g., id at 1494-1504; Cortez, supra note 112, at 106-07, 121-23; Nathan Cortez,
Recalibrating the Legal Risks of Cross-Border Health Care, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1
(2010) (discussing patients seeking redress in the United States and foreign jurisdictions); Terry, supra
note 151, at 457-61; Philip Mirrer-Singer, Note, Medical Malpractice Overseas: The Legal Uncertainty
Surrounding Medical Tourism, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211 (2007).
232. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2(a)(9)-(10) (West 2008); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28,
§ 1300.68 (2008).
233. For example, the CMHI's proposal for binational insurance notes that legal and regulatory
standards between the United States and Mexico would "continue to be separate," and that "US
providers will NOT be responsible for the quality of services in Mexico." CMHI, supra note 185, at 2.
234. See Cortez, supra note 231, at 67-77.
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by statute any liability waivers the plans might use; (4) prohibit plans from
using foreign providers that do not consent to U.S. jurisdiction or
alternative dispute resolution; (5) require cross-border insurers to cover
necessary follow-up care by domestic providers; 236 or (6) simply require
plans to disclose that patients may not have legal recourse against foreign
providers in the United States and may have to rely on foreign complaint
mechanisms in which it can be exceedingly difficult to recover satisfactory
compensation. 237 Any of these mechanisms would help reduce the legal
uncertainty that daunts cross-border plans. 238
6. The Normative Ambiguities of Cross-Border Insurance
Together, the five elements of this proposal raise an overarching
normative question: Should states relax minimum standards to improve
access to affordable care?239 If existing laws do.not anticipate cross-border
care, to what extent should states change their laws to accommodate it?
How much should states deviate from their existing requirements, and
would these deviations jeopardize the minimum standards for ensuring
access to quality care that we otherwise can accept?
Another risk of embracing cross-border insurance is that it might
further segment our health care system, separating those who can afford
care in the United States from those who cannot. If insurers have too much
discretion or insufficient oversight, they might market junk policies that
offer inferior coverage and quality to marginalized groups like low-income
patients and immigrants. How far should we stretch our standards to insure
these groups? Will insurers be able to cream-skim and charge more to
patients too sick and frail to travel overseas, or perhaps try to send sicker
patients overseas in response to pay-for-performance or other quality
incentives?
Moreover, there is some precedent for relaxing standards to expand
236. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1560; Cortez, supra note 112, at 122; Cortez, supra note 231, at 80.
237. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 16, at 1517-20; Cortez, supra note 231, at 85-89; Cortez, supra
note 112, at 118-19.
238. Note, however, that some new governance theorists believe it is crucial for domestic courts
or at least alternative dispute resolution to serve as a backstop. Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note
196, at 341 ("The political benefits of adjudicating matters domestically rather than giving jurisdiction
to an international tribunal over which domestic officials have little or no control creates new incentives
to act locally.").
239. Glenn Cohen frames the issue slightly differently in terms of lower quality care rather than
lower regulatory standards governing that care: "We also need a theory that tells us when we should
allow individuals to choose care of lesser quality to achieve cost savings. . . ." Cohen, supra note 16, at
1491.
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access to affordable care. In 2004, Texas revised its Insurance Code to
authorize new "consumer choice" plans, exempting these plans from some
minimum benefit requirements, such as mental health care, in vitro
fertilization, and care for hearing impairment.24 0 The legislature's intent
was to make available "more affordable and flexible" health plans.241 Yael
Cohen and Adam Lenert emphasized how this law established a possible
precedent for cross-border plans:
For the first time, [Texas law] created a two-tier health care system that
acknowledges that not everyone can afford the type of health insurance
plans that meet all of the state's mandates for the highest quality of
services. The ideology behind the law is that a less extensive coverage
plan is necessary in order to reach the large numbers of uninsured that
could not afford the traditional health insurance plans.242
In 2009, Texas companies offering these "consumer choice" plans
reported cost savings averaging between 5 and 10 percent.243 Although
these plans do not suddenly make health insurance affordable to all
uninsured Texans, they may represent the first step in recognizing that
"some care is better than no care," giving legal legitimacy to a two-tiered
health insurance system. 24 4
This normative quandary also evokes the ever-present question of
"value for money" in health care.24 5 Lower-income patients (and
particularly immigrants) may have a different conception of value and
quality, and may be more willing to seek health care outside the United
States. This proposal asks us to consider whether value, quality, or
"performance" should be an individualized decision made by patients or a
collective one. 246 In a pluralistic society, it is difficult to imagine one-size-
fits all judgments of value and quality that satisfy us all. Moreover, the U.S.
health care system already discriminates among patients based on their
240. 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 21.3501 (2010); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1507.001 (West 2009);
Approved SB 541 Consumer Choice Plans as of April 29, 2010, TEX. DEPT. OF INS.,
http://www.tdi.state.tx.us/health/documents/lhccplst_73004.pdf [hereinafter S.B. 541 Consumer Choice
Plans].
241. S.B. 541, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003).
242. Cohen & Lenert, supra note 192, at 90. A related normative question is whether states should
differentiate standards for Mexican citizens and American citizens. The Texas Department of Insurance
raised this possibility when considering binational health plans. Id. at 84.
243. See S.B. 541 Consumer Choice Plans, supra note 240.
244. Cohen & Lenert, supra note 192, at 90. See also id. at 92.
245. William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between
Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 509 (2008).
246. Id. at 509, 513, 516 (citing the United States' negative experience with managed care during
the 1980s and 1990s as "America's inability to engage affordable access to basic medical care as a
collective issue").
900 [Vol. 84:859
2011] EMBRACING THE NEW GEOGRA PHY OF HEALTH CARE
ability to pay, and health reform does little to change this. If our health care
system as currently constructed does not offer affordable care domestically,
it is difficult to make the normative argument that foreign providers should
not be allowed to fill these gaps. Indeed, others have made parallel
arguments in other contexts (although these arguments generally propose
relaxed quality standards).247
I argue that while this proposal would require us to expand our
conception of how health care can be delivered, it would not require us to
relax our standards per se. On the one hand, it would require us to relax our
geographic preconceptions of health care that envision patients accessing
virtually all care relatively close to home. States would need to reconceive
laws and regulations that accommodate only this domestic framework. On
the other hand, the proposal considers relaxing geographic rather than
quality standards. And it would provide considerably more regulation to
cross-border phenomena like medical tourism, outsourcing, and repatriation
that remain largely unregulated.
V. REGULATING QUALITY OVERSEAS VIA NEW GOVERNANCE
Because government oversight of the cross-border market will
probably remain minimal, this proposal relies on theories of new
governance to regulate cross-border plans and the quality of care they
provide. Examples include insurers leaning on foreign providers to adopt
U.S.-inspired quality standards as a condition of payment, or
nongovernment initiatives to develop industry standards and best practices.
But before explaining how to apply new governance here, it is worth
discussing what new governance is and why it is well suited to this area.
This part offers theoretical support for relying on alternative forms of
regulation, given the low likelihood of traditional regulation.
247. David A. Hyman, Accountable Managed Care: Should We Be Careful What We Wish For?,
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 803 (1999) ("[G]iven the choice between unaccountable but affordable
insurance coverage and accountable insurance coverage which is unaffordable for some percentage of
those currently insured, why are we so quick to conclude that the latter should be not just the default
term, but a mandatory minimum?"); David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice,
and the Eternal Triangle: Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 353, 394 n. 177
(1997) ("Given the choice between something and nothing, most people would have little difficulty
choosing the former, but our legal system and ethical framework directly and intentionally precludes
that option."); John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard, 77
VA. L. REv. 439, 487 (1991) ("By embracing the chimera of equality between the rich and poor, [tort
law] effectively disables health care providers from offering reasonable, low-cost care to large numbers
of the medically indigent.").
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A. WHY NEw GOVERNANCE?
New governance generally represents alternative regulatory initiatives
that deemphasize traditional command and control regulation-typically
expressed through binding "hard law" and enforced through formal
sanctions-and instead emphasize a flexible approach that employs some
combination of the following: voluntary cooperation; public-private
partnerships; networks; decentralization; information gathering and
dissemination; and the use of nonbinding "soft law" such as guidelines,
standards, and best practices. 248  International forms have emerged,
sometimes labeled "Transnational New Governance." 249 New governance
theories generally unite around shifting away from traditional government
regulation where it is impractical or ineffective.
New governance offers several commonly cited benefits over
traditional regulation, including greater responsiveness, customization,
cost-effectiveness, and even higher levels of compliance.250 In addition to
these general advantages, new governance should be particularly useful for
regulating cross-border phenomena like medical tourism, outsourcing, and
repatriation that are virtually unregulated and probably will remain so. Like
some other international markets, the cross-border market largely operates
without government oversight, in a sort of Hobbesian state of nature.251
New governance is filling regulatory voids in a variety of markets,
particularly "in those areas that have experienced the most private-sector
248. E.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
501, 507-09 (2009); John D. Blum, New Governance and Health Care Regulation, 2 ASIAN J. WTO &
INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 125, 126 (2007); Scott Burris, Michael Kempa & Clifford Shearing,
Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 3-
4 (2008); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (2005) ("[V]arious transnational systems of
regulation or regulatory cooperation have been established through international treaties and more
informal intergovernmental networks of cooperation . . . ."); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MrNN. L. REV. 342, 345-
47 (2004); Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L.
REv. 137, 146-50 (2006). See also Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale:
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1497-98 (2006).
249. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 509-10.
250. Blum, supra note 248, at 127-28; John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing
Economies, 34 WORLD DEV. 884, 886-88 (2006).
251. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 192 (1996)
(noting that nonstate actors interact "in a system of international commercial transactions that operates
largely without governmental intervention"). The one narrow exception is a discrete trio of cross-border
insurers overseen by California regulators. See infra Part V.B.5.
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globalization," such as banking and securities. 25 2 The emergence of cross-
border phenomena like medical tourism and repatriation has been
accompanied by similar calls for voluntary international cooperation. 253
New governance is most useful when traditional regulation is neither
likely nor feasible. It is doubtful that the federal government will regulate
cross-border health care in the near future. States are more likely to
intervene, as demonstrated in California and Texas, but state regulation will
be more piecemeal and subject to greater enforcement constraints.254 For
example, the one narrow segment of cross-border care that is regulated in
California is overseen by the Department of Managed Health Care, which
is understaffed and overwhelmed with these responsibilities. 255
Traditional regulation is also unlikely because foreign providers
generally reside beyond the purview of domestic regulators. 25 6 As with
other transnational markets, cross-border care suffers from "a lack of
domestic governance capacity, a lack of domestic will to act, and new
problems that exceed the ordinary ability of states to address." 257 New
governance offers useful theories to fill these voids. For example, the
California Department of Managed Health Care relies on private insurers to
regulate the quality of care offered by foreign providers, supporting the
precept that states can "deliberately shar[e] power as a means of exercising
it." 258 The European Union has also embraced new governance in areas like
employment, education, and health, in which top-down regulation arguably
has failed.259
There are, however, strong arguments that alternative methods of
regulation are not ideal for this type of market. As Jody Freeman notes in
the context of privatizing public contracts,
252. Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52
EMORY L.J. 1353, 1357 (2003).
253. Cortez, supra note 112, at 127-31; Hervey & Trubek, supra note 11, at 627.
254. Moreover, state regulation of cross-border health care might run afoul of the Foreign
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For one of the only in-depth treatments of the
boundaries of this clause, see Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV.
949 (2010).
255. Lenert & Cohen, supra note 207, at 26-27. The Department of Managed Health Care must
conduct regular financial and medical audits, review quarterly and annual reports, approve certain
changes to licensed plans, and manage other regulatory and oversight responsibilities. Id.
256. Cortez, supra note 231, at 9-14.
257. Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 196, at 333.
258. Burris, Kempa & Shearing, supra note 248, at 4.
259. Hervey & Trubek, supra note I1, at 627 (noting that new governance offers "'bottom up'
solutions to complex social problems, where 'top down' regulation has either failed to deliver, or where
it is constitutionally unavailable"); Lobel, supra note 248, at 386.
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The argument for publicization is strongest in instances when services
are highly contentious, value-laden, and hard to specify, and when
providers enjoy significant discretion; when services affect vulnerable
populations with few exit options and little political clout; and/or when
the motivation for privatization is explicitly ideological or clearly
corrupt. 260
Although cross-border insurance meets many of these criteria, new
governance is still worth pursuing for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, new governance is not new to the health industry.
Health care is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the United
States, and its regulations are "both voluminous and costly." 261 As Rand
Rosenblatt notes, the U.S. health sector has relied at various historical
points on more traditional regulation, but we have transitioned into a new
phase characterized by nonconventional forms. 262  Moreover, new
governance accommodates two key traditions in U.S. health care: the
longstanding preference of having physicians regulated by peers, or at least
by nongovernment bodies;263 and the traditional responsibility of states.264
Health care "has historically drawn heavily on self-regulatory structures,
and thus, governance mechanisms that involve the relevant actors in norm
setting 'from within,' rather than the imposition of norms 'from above."'
265
Indeed, scholars like Tamara Hervey and Louise Trubek have begun to
apply these lessons to cross-border care.
New governance is also useful for cross-border health care because
domestic regulators have limited jurisdiction over problems of international
scope.266 Its precepts hold theoretical appeal because more cooperative
approaches "comport with deep-seated intuitions about how globalization
260. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV.
1285, 1291 (2003).
261. Blum, supra note 248, at 128.
262. Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages ofHealth Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155, 193 (2004). See
also Trubek, supra note 248, at 147-48.
263. Sage, supra note 245, at 498-99. Indeed, the most influential account of the history of
American medicine characterizes it as the ongoing quest of physicians to resist regulation by corporate
or government entities. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 3-9
(1982).
264. Several states have experimented with new governance techniques that integrate patients and
community input into quality of care initiatives. Trubek, supra note 248, at 143-44.
265. Hervey & Trubek, supra note 11, at 627 (footnote omitted).
266. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 509-11; Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra
note 248, at 53-54; Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599, 2604 (1997); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 299, 318-21
(2006) (discussing how, in general, new governance's popularity stems from globalization).
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really works." 267 But new governance also holds a practical appeal because
it can scale down transnational problems by allowing interested parties
from different jurisdictions to cooperate.2 68 And perhaps more importantly,
new governance allows us to spread regulatory principles to countries with
limited capacity to regulate themselves-what Kal Raustiala terms
"regulatory gospel." 269 Thus, new governance appeals here because cross-
border health care phenomena are transnational and foreign providers
generally reside beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. regulators.
Related to the preceding point, most foreign providers that attract U.S.
patients are located in developing countries that lack the internal capacity
to regulate effectively. These countries not only have less governmental
capacity to regulate, but also have less social infrastructure and civil
society to account for these deficiencies. 270 New governance "mobilizes
cheaper forms of social control" and allows developing countries to rely on
foreign regulators who have an incentive to enforce legal norms there.2 71
Thus, new governance can help counter "weak enforcement capabilities" in
developing countries.2 2 It can help assure U.S. patients and insurers that
rely on foreign providers that these providers meet acceptable standards.
Moreover, like other young industries that struggle for legitimacy, the
cross-border health industry should prefer new governance not only to
traditional regulation, but also to zero regulation. Providers and facilitators
can use new governance to respond to reputational concerns and growing
public apprehension that medical tourism and related phenomena are
unregulated.273 The industry also benefits because new governance asks the
private sector to contribute to technical standards that govern the industry
267. Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN.
REv. L. Soc. SCI. 211, 218 (2006).
268. Lobel, supra note 248, at 382-83.
269. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 32 (2002) (quoting Interviews with SEC
officials, SEC Headquarters, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 2000)). For example, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") has long spread "the 'regulatory gospel' of U.S. securities law" around
the world to help it influence conduct beyond its jurisdiction. Id. See also Macey, supra note 252, at
1356 (noting that agencies might seek to "export" regulatory powers and principles to other countries to
avoid regulatory arbitrage by regulated parties seeking more favorable regulatory environments).
270. See Braithwaite, supra note 250, at 884-86. Developing countries, however, are not
monolithic. For example, "Some larger developing societies such as India have strong democratic states
with substantial, sophisticated bureaucracies and courts." Id at 896.
271. Id. at 884. See also id. at 891 (regulation of intellectual property piracy); id. at 896 (U.S.
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") regulation of foreign clinical trials).
272. Id. at 888.
273. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 504.
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and perform other "arguably public functions."27 4 In the health industry,
private providers and insurers already formulate health policy by making
decisions about coverage and quality.275 This is particularly true in the
cross-border industry. Insurers that use foreign providers are making
important coverage and quality decisions. As I explain below, the industry
is already establishing standards and best practices, and is verifying
compliance with these new requirements. My proposal thus implements
Nan Hunter's suggestion that because the primary concern of health law is
managing risk, we should use insurance as a "technology" to practice new
governance. 276
Finally, new governance is typically easier and less costly to
implement than traditional regulation, which requires formal legislation or
rulemaking.277 It makes use of relatively modest levers to ensure that the
governance is effective and legitimate. 278 For example, payors in the cross-
border industry have begun to require that foreign hospitals be accredited
by JCI, and this has become a powerful de facto industry standard without
consuming public resources. 279
In short, new governance holds particular promise for unregulated,
international phenomena like cross-border health care that involve actors in
developing countries that reside beyond the purview of U.S. regulators. It
may not be preferable to traditional regulation, but traditional regulation is
unlikely and inherently limited given the market's transnational scope.
B. How NEW GOVERNANCE CAN REGULATE CROSS-BORDER CARE
New governance allows us to respond to phenomena like medical
tourism, outsourcing, and repatriation that are plagued by pervasive
uncertainty, particularly the lingering suspicion that U.S. patients will
receive lower quality care in developing countries. 280 These concerns are
animated first by the lack of credible information on quality; second, by
doubts that foreign jurisdictions employ the same caliber of professional
274. Freeman, supra note 260, at 1289. See also Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 663-64 (2000); Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental
Regulation: How Could It Be Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 513, 515 (2008) (citing examples of
nonstate regulatory programs).
275. Hunter, supra note 16, at 44.
276. Id. at 1, 8.
277. Zaring, supra note 266, at 299-300.
278. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 511.
279. See infra Part V.B..
280. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 16, at 1490; Cortez, supra note 112, at 102-06; Lenert &
Shanahan, supra note 203, at 247; Terry, supra note 151, at 454-55.
906 [Vol. 84:859
2011] EMBRACING THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF HEALTH CARE
credentialing, hospital accreditation, and interlocking judicial and
regulatory oversight used in the United States;281 and third, by the
suspicion that as cross-border care becomes more commonplace and
lucrative, lower quality providers will enter the market.282 A final
aggravation is our perceived inability to influence the quality of care
overseas, either ex ante (such as through regulation) or ex post (such as
through litigation or regulatory enforcement).
I use the following four methods of new governance to address these
concerns. First, the cross-border industry and its patrons can generate
quality standards and other forms of "soft law" for foreign providers.
Second, insurers and other payors can leverage coverage and
reimbursement to require that foreign providers meet these standards.
Third, emerging networks surrounding cross-border care can help develop
and enforce these standards. And fourth, these tools can generate credible
information about the quality of foreign providers, which would benefit
both the industry and its patrons. This section concludes by discussing why
this proposal is a hybrid form of new governance, relying as it does on at
least minimal government regulation and hard law as a backstop.
1. Regulating Quality Through Industry Standards and Soft Law
The primary benefit of new governance is that it can introduce
standards, best practices, and other forms of soft law to industries that
would otherwise lack them. Indeed, the cross-border health industry
already practices this type of new governance. Private, voluntary programs
are generating industry standards and verifying compliance with them.
The best example is international hospital accreditation, which is
becoming a de facto prerequisite for hospitals that attract foreign
clientele.283 At least four organizations have established such standards,
including: JCI, an arm of the major U.S. hospital accreditor; QHA Trent,
originally developed to accredit hospitals and clinics for Britain's National
Health Service; 284 the Australian Council on Healthcare Standards
International, which accredits foreign hospitals based on Australian
standards;285 and the International Organization for Standardization, which
281. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 16, at 1489.
282. Id. at 1492-93.
283. See Cortez, supra note 112, at 83-84.
284. See QHA TRENT, http://www.qha-intemational.co.uk (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
285. See ACHSI Around the World, AUSTL. COUNCIL ON HEALTHCARE STANDARDS INT'L,
http://www.achs.org.au/ACHSlaroundtheworld (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
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certifies that international hospitals meet quality management standards. 286
The most well-known of these is JCI, which has accredited roughly
275 facilities in thirty-five foreign countries. 287 JCI accreditation parallels
the process by which its domestic parent, the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations ("Joint Commission"), accredits
U.S. hospitals.288 JCI visits foreign hospitals to determine whether they
satisfy six overarching International Patient Safety Goals. For example, a
hospital must "Improve the Safety of High-Alert Medications" and
"Reduce the Risk of Health Care-Associated Infections." 289 JCI evaluates
whether a hospital satisfies these goals by assessing whether it complies
with more than one hundred standards, which JCI further reduces into
several "measurable elements." 290
For example, an overarching patient safety goal requires hospitals to
"Identify Patients Correctly." 29' A corresponding standard requires that
"[p]atients are admitted to receive inpatient care or registered for outpatient
services based on their identified health care needs and the organization's
mission and resources."292 JCI surveyors measure compliance with this
standard by evaluating seven "[m]easurable [e]lements," such as "[p]atients
are accepted only if the organization can provide the necessary services and
the appropriate outpatient or inpatient setting for care," and "[p]olicies
identify which screening and diagnostic tests are standard before
admission."293
Hospitals must meet a minimum score on each of one hundred-plus
standards, as well as minimum aggregate scores for each category;
otherwise, JCI gives the facility additional time to demonstrate
286. See About ISO, INT'L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, http://www. iso.org/iso/about.htm (last
visited Apr. 22, 2011).
287. See JCI Accredited Organizations, JOINT COMM'N INT'L, http://www.joint
commissionintemational.org/JCI-Accredited-Organizations (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
288. Cortez, supra note 112, at 83-84. Although accreditation is voluntary in the United States,
most U.S. hospitals seek Joint Commission accreditation because it satisfies conditions for participating
in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.5 (2010). Like its parent, JCI has been
criticized for potential financial conflicts of interest. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1508, 1516-17; Cortez,
supra note 112, at 125-26.





293. Standards, Intents, and Measurable Elements, Admission to the Organization, JOINT
COMM'N INT'L 41, http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/common/pdfs/jcial Standard-Intent-
MEsHospital_3rd-ed.pdf
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compliance.2 94 The survey itself can take several weeks and the entire
accreditation process can take two to three years 295 This voluntary process
is designed to signal that the foreign hospital meets certain recognized
international quality standards.
Hospital accreditation represents new governance in many ways. Like
other industries, the cross-border health industry is using accreditation to
proselytize international standards in "competitive, non-harmonious
environments" that "could hardly be less centralized."296 Moreover, JCI
and other accreditors are primarily private actors that both prescribe and
standardize behavior,297 generating industry norms and best practices. The
standards represent a form of soft law or private regulation. 298 And even
though accreditation standards do not formally bind,299 they have become
de facto standards that require compliance as a practical matter. This type
of soft law may have as much impact on industry practices as traditional
laws. 30 0
Finally, consistent with new governance, these accreditation schemes
rely on significant reputational and financial pressures to monitor and
report compliance. 30' Hospitals market their accreditation to signal that
they meet international standards, and the proliferation of hospitals seeking
294. Accreditation Decision Rules, JOINT COMM'N INT'L 1 (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/common/pdfs/fpdfs/pubs/pdfs/JCI%2Oezine/JCIA%20200
9%2OHosp%20Accreditation%20Decision%2ORules.pdf.
295. See JCI Accreditation Process Time Line, JOINT COMM'N INT'L, http://www.
jointcommissioninternational.org/Accreditation-and-Certification/JCI-Accreditation-Process-Timeline
(last visited Apr. 22, 2011) (advising applicants to begin preparing for the JCI accreditation survey
twelve to twenty-four months in advance of the actual survey).
296. Zaring, supra note 266, at 313. See also Zaring, supra note 195, at 551, 580-85. JCI and the
Joint Commission also collaborate with the World Health Organization's ("WHO's") patient safety
programs, the Collaborative Center for Patient Safety Solutions and the World Alliance for Patient
Safety. WHO COLLABORATING CTR. FOR PATIENT SAFETY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.ccforpatientsafety.org (last visited Apr. 24, 2011); World Alliance for Patient Safety, WHO
COLLABORATING CTR. FOR PATIENT SAFETY SOLUTIONS, http://www.ccforpatientsafety.org/World-
Alliance-for-Patient-Safety (last visited Apr. 24, 2011). Indeed, the WHO program is a prototypical
form of new governance, as it "coordinates efforts to spread [patient safety] solutions as broadly as
possible internationally through its work with ministries of health, patient safety experts, national
agencies on patient safety, health care professional associations, and consumer organizations." WHO
Redesignates JCI, JOINT COMM'N INT'L, http://www.jointcommissionintemational.org/ WHO-
Redesignates-JCI (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
297. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 505 n.15 (citing Stepan Wood, Voluntary
Environmental Codes and Sustainability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 229, 230
(Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006)).
298. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 506 & n.26.
299. See Trubek, supra note 248, at 149.
300. Id. at 149-50; Lobel, supra note 248, at 388-89.
301. See Hervey & Trubek, supra note I1, at 638.
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accreditation demonstrates its value.302 In fact, other segments of the cross-
border health industry are trying to replicate this model.303
States can require that cross-border plans use only accredited
facilities, or simply rely on reputational concerns to drive this trend. And as
I note elsewhere, states could provide some much-needed oversight of JCI
to counterbalance financial conflicts of interest.
2. Regulating Quality Through Insurers
State laws authorizing cross-border insurance can rely on insurers to
"regulate" the quality of foreign providers. Insurers and others that pay for
cross-border care can leverage their purchasing power to require that
foreign providers satisfy specified standards, such as hospital accreditation,
physician licensing, and other quality-related criteria. Glenn Cohen and I
both have recommended that payors channel patients to high-quality
providers by using JCI accreditation and other proxies as "indicia of
quality."305 Many payors seem to be using these levers on their own, but
states should still require them.
The new governance literature sometimes refers to this as supply
chain leveraging. 306  Public and private insurers frequently condition
coverage and reimbursement on suppliers meeting specified criteria. Like
companies in other industries, foreign hospitals would "commit themselves
to traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative
opportunities."307 Access to U.S. patients may allow organizations like JCI
to induce compliance with U.S.-inspired standards. 308 Again, foreign
providers will comply with these voluntary standards not out of legal
302. Virtually every accredited hospital advertises its JCI accreditation on its website. Cortez,
supra note 112, at 86. Between 2005 and 2007, JCI had accredited over eighty hospitals. Id. at 83 &
n.91. Today, JCI has accredited over 300 hospitals. About Joint Commission International, JOINT
COMM'N INT'L, http://www.jointcommissionintemational.org/about-jci (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
303. The Medical Tourism Association ("MTA") has created a facilitator certification program
meant to signal that companies that arrange for patient travel meet certain minimum industry standards.
Although the MTA has only certified four companies as of February 2011, it serves a similar purpose as
JCI accreditation. See Cortez, supra note 231, at 78-80; Medical Tourism Association Facilitator
Certification, MED. TOURISM ASS'N, http://www.medicaltourismassociation.com/en/prod 2_medical-
tourism-association-facilitator-certification.htmI (last visited Apr. 24, 2011); List of Certified Medical
Tourism Facilitator Companies, MEDICAL TOURISM ASSOCIATION, http://www.medical
tourismassociation.com/en/certified-facilitators.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
304. Cortez, supra note 112, at 125-26.
305. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1516-17. See also Cortez, supra note 112, at 118-27.
306. Meidinger, supra note 274, at 516 (noting that supply chains are often transnational
networks, themselves subject to different jurisdictions).
307. Freeman, supra note 260, at 1285.
308. See Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 213-14.
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obligation, but out of economic motivation.309
The best example in the health industry is Medicare, which reimburses
hospitals only if they satisfy various "Conditions of Participation" that
touch on everything from hospital quality controls to staff requirements.310
And public insurers continue to experiment with contract-based incentives.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") implemented
pilot programs requiring hospitals to adhere to pay-for-performance criteria
as a condition of reimbursement.311 CMS also requires hospitals to
maintain quality assessment and performance improvement programs to
reduce medical errors, delegating significant discretion to individual
hospitals to implement these broad requirements. 312 And Medicaid attaches
conditions to contracts with hospitals and managed care organizations. 313
These Medicare and Medicaid criteria are backstopped by the threat that a
hospital will not be reimbursed.314 Thus, contracting "may extend public
norms to private actors and lead to 're-regulation' rather than
deregulation."315
Cross-border payors have already embraced these devices. The
California Department of Managed Health Care relies on private plans to
ensure that providers in Mexico offer quality care, recognizing that the
state might not be able to exercise jurisdiction over foreign providers
directly.316 Although California law relies to some extent on Mexican
hospital and physician standards, 3 17 acknowledging that these standards
necessarily differ from those in the United States, it also relies on insurers
themselves to regulate foreign providers.318
309. Trubek, supra note 248, at 149-50.
310. 42 C.F.R. pt. 482 (2010). Note that the Medicare program allows hospitals to satisfy most
Conditions of Participation by receiving accreditation by the Joint Commission. Accredited hospitals
will be "deemed" to satisfy all but a few conditions. Id. § 488.5.
311. Revision to Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems, 71 Fed. Reg. 47,870, 48,046,
48,102-03 (Aug. 18, 2006) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 409, 410, 412, 413, 414, 424, 485, 489, and
505); Trubek, supra note 248, at 166. CMS implemented this pilot under Section 5001(b) of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5001(b), 120 Stat. 4, 29, which encourages such
programs.
312. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Hospital Conditions of Participation: Quality Assessment
and Performance Improvement, 42 C.F.R. pt. 482; Blum, supra note 248, at 131-32.
313. See James W. Fossett, Managed Care and Devolution, in MEDICAID AND DEVOLUTION 106,
122-23 (Frank J. Thompson & John J. Dilulio Jr. eds., 1998).
314. Blum, supra note 248, at 132. See also 68 Fed. Reg. 3435, 3443, 3446 (Jan. 24, 2003).
315. Freeman, supra note 260, at 1286 (footnote omitted).
316. Lenert & Cohen, supra note 207, at 20.
317. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2(a)(1) (West 2008) (requiring plans and medical
directors overseeing care in Mexico to be lawfully licensed in Mexico).
318. Lenert & Cohen, supra note 207, at 19-20.
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States should consider the following precedents from California's
cross-border insurers. First, the California plans require that Mexican
physicians (1) have graduated from medical school; (2) are members in
good standing with a professional medical association; (3) have a valid
license to practice, including board certification for specialists; (4) are
registered with the Mexican Secretary of Health to prescribe drugs;
(5) have clinical privileges in good standing at a network hospital; and
(6) have malpractice insurance.319
States or insurers could also use access to U.S. patients as a carrot to
encourage foreign providers to adopt adequate practice standards. For
example, insurers sometimes require providers to use clinical practice
guidelines ("CPGs") and other protocols for specific ailments. 32 0 In the
United States, the public and private sectors have collaborated to produce
over two thousand CPGs over the past decade. 32 1 Similarly, insurers and
other payors for cross-border care can require that foreign providers adhere
to certain practice standards.
Insurers can also impose requirements on foreign hospitals.
California's cross-border plans generally require foreign hospitals to be
accredited by the Mexican government and be members of the National
Hospital Association. 322 As such, hospitals in these cross-border insurance
networks may be audited by multiple oversight bodies, such as the
California Department of Managed Health Care, the Mexican Secretary of
Health, and the insurance companies themselves. 323
State laws authorizing cross-border plans should consider a
combination of these requirements and encourage insurers to generate more
"indicia of quality."324 Or, states that do not wish to get into the business of
setting standards for foreign providers might simply delegate to insurers the
duty to regulate the quality of care overseas. The experience of the WGA is
319. Maguire, supra note 179, at 55-56 (discussing SIMNSA and Health Net); Savio, supra note
179, at 36-37 (discussing Blue Shield); Shanahan, supra note 179, at 72 (discussing the WGA).
320. Hunter, supra note 16, at 15-16.
32 1. Id at 15 (citing Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Difusion of
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 373, 417-18 (2002)).
322. See Maguire, supra note 179, at 55-56; Savio, supra note 179, at 37-38; Shanahan, supra
note 179, at 72.
323. Maguire, supra note 179, at 55-56; Shanahan, supra note 179, at 72. BlueShield established
requirements for Mexican hospitals that require them to meet minimum standards for measuring patient
outcomes, credentialing, maintaining medical records, and managing facilities. Savio, supra note 179,
at 36, 38, 42-44. The California insurers generally work with Mexico-based companies to monitor
quality of care-Blue Shield works with General de Salud and Health Net relies on SIMNSA. Id at 43;
Maguire, supra note 179, at 49.
324. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1516.
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particularly instructive here. As a self-funded ERISA plan, the WGA had to
establish and monitor quality standards itself, without relying on state
regulation. 325 The WGA has developed its own quality control standards
and checklists for both U.S. and Mexican providers, and frequently inspects
facilities for compliance. 326 Membership in the WGA's lucrative network
gives Mexican providers significant incentives to provide quality care.327
Thus, the WGA generally requires that services provided in Mexico meet
the company's own quality standards as a condition of payment, and
frequently visits facilities to audit for quality.328 The WGA has declined to
renew contracts with Mexican facilities that did not meet its standards. 329
This counters a potential asymmetry by which providers in Mexico might
access lucrative U.S. markets without complying with more onerous U.S.
regulations. 330
3. Regulating Quality Through Transnational Networks
We should also rely on emerging transnational networks to "regulate"
cross-border plans, as well as phenomena like medical tourism,
outsourcing, and repatriation. Network cooperation has long been a
hallmark of new governance, 331 and it offers several potential benefits here.
Networks can create epistemic communities of those with special expertise
and competence, 332 which can generate standards and police compliance
with them.333 Domestic regulators are collaborating in a wide variety of
325. Shanahan, supra note 179, at 71-72.
326. Id.
327. See id.
328. Id. at 72.
329. Id.
330. See Macey, supra note 252, at 1360-61 (noting how foreign securities issuers used American
Depository Receipts to market their securities to U.S. investors without being subject to SEC regulation,
which was "a clever means for foreign issuers to avoid the reach of U.S. securities law").
331. See Hervey & Trubek, supra note 11, at 639 (noting that participation from the "main
necessary stakeholders" is required). A consensus is emerging that traditional state-centered governance
is ceding ground to a more polycentric form of distributed governance. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra
note 250, at 890; Burris, Kempa & Shearing, supra note 248, at 12-13, 25-27; Slaughter & Burke-
White, supra note 196, at 334-35.
332. Koh, supra note 266, at 2648 n.246 (noting Peter Haas's definition of epistemic community
as a "network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (quoting Peter M.
Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1, 3
(1992))); Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 214.
333. Network governance occurs via repeated interactions-the more actors from different
jurisdictions interact, the more they will intemalize international norms domestically. Koh, supra note
251, at 199, 203-05; Koh, supra note 266, at 2602-03. Thus, we should encourage the cross-border
industry and its patrons to interact "in forums capable of generating norms." Koh, supra note 251, at
206.
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areas, including antitrust regulation, aviation, consumer protection,
criminal justice, education, environmental protection, financial regulation,
food and drug regulation, human rights, information technology, labor
rights, public health, tax, telecommunications, and transportation.33 4 These
collaborations are useful because they can generate and encourage
compliance with standards that otherwise might not exist. With cross-
border care, the goal is to avoid a race to the bottom between jurisdictions
competing for patients.335 Fortunately, there already exists a fairly robust
series of networks and collaborations that touch on various aspects of
cross-border health care, including binational insurance and border health
initiatives with Mexico. Five categories of networks and collaborations are
particularly promising here.
a. Industry Networks
The cross-border industry is beginning to coalesce around several
transnational networks. Trade groups like the Medical Tourism Association
("MTA") provide a forum for companies to interact.336 Association
members include hospitals, clinics, medical tourism facilitators,
government agencies, and related businesses from nearly every major
continent.337 Several industry periodicals have emerged that analyze cross-
border trends.33 8 Accreditors like JCI act like de facto network nodes by
334. Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 215-16 (listing industries); Zaring, supra note 266, at
319-20 (same); Zaring, supra note 195, at 549-50 (same). See also Lobel, supra note 248, at 345
(noting that a new governance model is instigating change in a variety of fields, and listing examples);
Meidinger, supra note 274, at 530 (listing supragovernmental regulatory standards); Joseph J. Norton,
The Modern Genre of Infrastructural Law Reform: The Legal and Practical Realities-The Case of
Banking Reform in Thailand, 55 SMU L. REV. 235, 238 (2002) (noting how the international financial
community developed consensus standards). Cooperation in these areas has been "driven by the basic
need of government officials in one country to interact with their counterparts in another to regulate
increasingly mobile and global private actors." Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 215. See also
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 261-71 (2004). In fact, federal agencies like the
SEC and Federal Reserve Board are seen by many as "international lawmakers" given their
international reach and cooperation with foreign regulators. Zaring, supra note 266, at 318.
Harmonization between jurisdictions will help avoid "regulatory arbitrage" between jurisdictions and
forum shopping by patients and providers. Id at 300-01; Macey, supra note 252, at 1353-54, 1362.
335. Eleanor Kinney has expressed concern that economic integration between the U.S. and
Mexican health care sectors could "precipitate[] a race to the bottom in terms of providing accessible,
high quality health care at an affordable cost." Kinney, supra note 187, at 958. But as Anne-Marie
Slaughter and David Zaring note, international networks can provide "an alternative to the paradigm of
a regulatory race to the top or bottom." Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 217.
336. See About the MTA, MED. TOURISM ASS'N, http://www.medicaltourism
association.comlen/about-the-MTA.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., INT'L MED. TRAVEL J., http://www.imtjonline.com/welcome (last visited Apr. 24,
2011).
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not only applying relatively uniform standards to hospitals in different
jurisdictions, but also by factoring local practices into accreditation
standards.339 In California, insurers like Health Net tend to have "strong
relationship[s]" with the Mexican government.340 Each of these
collaborations can help generate pseudoregulatory norms.
b. Professional Medical Networks
Professional medical societies have addressed cross-border trends, and
could provide much-needed expertise to develop industry standards. The
AMA published the "first ever guidance on medical tourism,"341 calling for
"employers, insurance companies, and other entities that facilitate or
incentivize medical care outside the U.S." to follow nine rules. 34 2 The
AMA and the California Medical Association both have debated medical
repatriation, with the latter publicly condemning it.343 The National
Hispanic Medical Association organized a forum on binational health
insurance at the U.S. Senate, attended by regulators from the United States
and Mexico.34 4 These organizations have an obvious interest in cross-
border trends and should continue to contribute to emerging norms and
standards here.
c. Hospital Networks
Several flagship U.S. hospitals and medical schools have formalized
relationships with foreign hospitals that attract international clientele.
Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Cornell, Columbia, and Duke have relationships
with hospitals in several countries, including Brazil, Chile, India, and
Singapore.34 5 World-renowned hospitals like the Cleveland Clinic and the
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center also have international
339. JCI uses Regional Advisory Councils "to facilitate JCI's awareness and understanding of
important regional health care quality, patient safety, health financing, and health policy issues, and
cultural needs and requirements." Regional Advisory Councils, JOINT COMM'N INTL,
http://www.jointcommissioninternational.org/Regional-Advisory-Councils (last visited Apr. 24, 2011)
[hereinafter JCI, Regional Advisory Councils].
340. Maguire, supra note 179, at 59.
341. "AMA Provides First Ever Guidance on Medical Tourism," MED. NEWS TODAY (June 17,
2008), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/111577.php.
342. New AMA Guidelines on Medical Tourism, AM. MED. ASS'N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/3 1/medicaltourism.pdf [hereinafter AMA Guidelines].
343. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
344. CMHI, supra note 185, at 2; Forum Seeks to Increase Insured, Expand Cross-Border Health
Coverage, HISPANICBUSINESS.COM (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/news/ 2005/2/7/
forum seeks toincreaseinsured expand.htm.
345. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 119, at 16-17. These relationships vary,
however, in how much the collaborators actually collaborate.
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partnerships. 346 Foreign hospitals proudly fly these flags, demonstrating
that their hospitals meet Western standards. And like professional medical
societies, U.S. hospitals and medical schools have an obvious stake in
cross-border phenomena. Again, we should use these networks to influence
emerging industry standards.
d. Public-Private Networks
Since the mid-1990s there has been a significant increase in
collaboration among the U.S.-Mexico border health programs. 347 These
collaborations can contribute significant expertise to cross-border
networks.34 8 The most notable of these is the Cross-Border Health
Insurance Initiative, 34 9  which "brought together private insurers,
government officials, and health leaders from both sides of the border" to
discuss access to affordable cross-border insurance. 35 0 The Initiative wrote
issue briefs and solicited competitive proposals for how to design and
market cross-border plans.351' This work has paved the way for later public-
private collaborations in the United States and Mexico, producing "an
information substructure and a network of relationships" that have enabled
more concentrated work on border and migrant health.352 Indeed, the
Initiative is perhaps the best example of a transnational network in this
area, and states and insurers should rely on its work.
States and insurers should also utilize other border health programs.
For example, the California-Mexico Health Initiative ("CMHI") at the
University of California, Berkeley is a genuine public-private network,
including "Mexican consulates, community clinics, county health services,
community-based organizations, hometown associations, boards of
346. Id.
347. See Laws, supra note 12, at 271-73. Foundations focusing on border health issues have
proliferated, including the Border Health Initiative and Alliance Healthcare Foundation. Id. at 273-74.
348. These public-private partnerships might embody the principles of "democratic
experimentalism" endorsed by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, which emphasize the use of guidelines,
benchmarking, and best practices implemented through public-private cooperation. Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 350, 354
(1998). Hybrid approaches combining traditional state regulation and decentralized governance among
private actors holds particular appeal for cross-border health care. Hervey & Trubek, supra note I1, at
627-28.
349. The Initiative was formed in 1998 by the California Health Care Foundation, the Mexican
Health Foundation, the Academy for International Health Studies, and Healthcare Redesign
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supervisors, legislators, and funding agencies." 353 As noted above, the
CMHI has worked on access to insurance for migrant workers, publishing a
"Proposed California Strategy for Binational Health Insurance" that
contemplates affordable binational plans. 354 In Texas, the Paso del Norte
Health Foundation is formulating programs that might complement the
programs in California.355 These programs can become quasi-regulators in
their own right by using a variety of pressure points, such as "naming and
shaming, restorative justice, consumer boycotts, strikes, and litigation."356
e. Government Networks
Finally, we can rely on the long accumulation of government-
sponsored border health programs. 35  In 1996, the U.S. Health Resources
and Services Administration ("HRSA") created the Border Health Initiative
to address primary care and public health along the border. 3 8 That same
year, HHS and Mexico's Secretary of Health formed a health care working
group called the U.S.-Mexico Bi-National Commission ("BNC") to
collaborate on public health, including migrant health.35 9 The BNC has
sponsored meetings and professional exchanges, and developed treatment
standards for common diseases. 360 A separate U.S-Mexico Border Health
Commission-chaired by the HHS secretary and including the director of
each border state's department of public health-was "the first ever created
between the United States and another country to specifically address
health issues." 361 The Commission's goals are to institutionalize domestic
thinking on border health issues and to "create an effective venue for
binational discussion" of public health issues along the border.3 62 Again,
each of these collaborations could contribute expertise to cross-border
networks.
Yet, despite this impressive range of collaborations, there is potential
353. Martinez, Mora & Spagnolo, supra note 212, at 222. See also Laws, supra note 12, at 275.
354. See CMHI, supra note 185.
355. Paso del Norte focuses on disease prevention and health promotion in west Texas, southern
New Mexico, and Ciudad Juirez, Mexico. Laws, supra note 12, at 273.
356. Braithwaite, supra note 250, at 888. See also Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 248,
at 35 (presenting examples of global institutions and networks that have established "greater procedural
transparency and participation").
357. Government-sponsored border health programs date back to the 1940s. Laws, supra note 12,
at 271.
358. Id. at 271-72.
359. Id. at 272.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. The USMBHC published its "Healthy Border 2010 Program Objectives" to identify and
mitigate the most significant public health threats affecting the border region. Id.
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for more streamlined and centralized cooperation. As it stands, this
constellation of collaborations might be overwhelming. Government
entities in both Mexico and the United States should formalize their
collaborations and create a model for similar collaborations with other
jurisdictions that draw U.S. patients, serving as a central repository for
other collaborations.
There are several candidates for spearheading centralized cooperation
in Mexico. The Secretary of Health licenses private insurers that offer
HMO-style prepaid plans, setting standards for patient rights and safety,
and inspecting the plans for compliance. 363 Mexico's General Health
Council certifies public and private hospitals based on standards set by the
Mexican Commission on Hospital Certification, and operates an additional,
voluntary certification system. 364
There are also several candidates for collaboration in the United
States. On the federal level, HRSA, CMS, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration all have contributed to border health programs. 3 6  The Food
and Drug Administration ("FDA") also has an interest in reimportation of
prescription drugs across the Mexican and Canadian borders.3 66 On the
state level, each of the border states runs border health programs,367 and
most have studied cross-border insurance. The Texas Senate convened a
committee to study binational health insurance after the legislature rejected
363. Mexico's private health insurers are known as "Instituciones de Seguros Especializadas en
Salud" ("ISES"), or Insurance Institutions Specializing in Health Care. The Secretary of Health is "La
Secretaria de Salud." Lenert & Cohen, supra note 207, at 25-26; CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE:
OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at app. C; SECRETARIA DE SALUD, http://portal.salud.gob.mx/
index eng.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2011).
364. The voluntary program is called the National Program of Medical Services Facilities
Certification. The standards govern facilities, equipment, and other physical operations. These national
regulations are known as "normas" (this one being the Norma Oficial Mexicana de Certificacion de
Hospitales y Consultorios). The General Health Council relies on a committee that includes
representatives from several official organizations, such as the Secretary of Health, the National
Autonomous University of Mexico, and the membership associations representing physicians, surgeons,
nurses, and hospitals. Facilities must be recertified every three years. Cesar Martinez, Certification of
Hospitals and in Mexico and Credentialing of Mexican Physicians, in CROSS-BORDER HEALTH
INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at app. E; Kerr, Pogue & Tucker, supra note 226, at
126.
365. Laws, supra note 12, at 272.
366. See, e.g., Imported Drugs Raise Safety Concerns, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYoulConsumers/ucml43561.htm (last updated May 1, 2009)
("The list of safety risks is long, but the principal problems involve the use of prescription drugs
without a physician's supervision and the danger of buying drugs of unknown origin and quality.").
367. Laws, supra note 12, at 272.
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bills that would have authorized such plans,368 and the Texas Department
of Insurance has met with its counterpart in Mexico. 369 Similarly, the
Arizona-Mexico Commission has studied cross-border health insurance. 370
And as noted above, California's Department of Managed Health Care
already regulates a segment of cross-border plans. Cross-border networks
should continue to rely on these collaborations and their work. Further,
collaborations with Mexican regulators could create a model for working
with other jurisdictions that host U.S. patients.
4. Generating Credible Information
Another key tenet of new governance is generating credible
information, and the methods above can help generate credible information
about cross-border care, particularly regarding the quality of foreign
providers. Counterintuitively, there is both a glut and a dearth of
information here: a glut of suspect information supplied by the industry that
promises care of equal or superior quality to that in the United States, and a
dearth of reliable information from objective sources that could test these
claims. Although American observers praise foreign hospitals for
publishing voluminous price and quality data compared to their U.S.
counterparts,37' there are very few ways to validate this data, so it is far
from clear whether the value of this data correlates at all to its volume. This
credibility gap warps the calculus for patients and payors considering
overseas care, complicating an already complex decision and probably
deterring some from pursuing care overseas at all.
As most of us can attest, "A plenitude of information leads to a
poverty of attention."372 Given the overabundance of industry-supplied
information in the cross-border market, there is great value not only in
testing the industry's claims and generating credible information, but also
in making this information accessible to purchasers.373 This function is
368. See Interim Committee on Binational Health Benefit Plan Coverage, TEX. ST. SENATE,
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/cl000/cl000.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2011); REPORT
OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON BINATIONAL HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN COVERAGE (2003), available at
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/cl000/downloads/binational.pdf, Cohen & Lenert,
supra note 192, at 84-87.
369. Cohen & Lenert, supra note 192, at 84.
370. See WALKER & GUERRERO, supra note 141, at 1.
371. E.g., DEVON M. HERRICK, NAT'L CTR. FOR POL'Y ANALYSIS, POLICY REPORT NO. 304,
MEDICAL TOURISM: GLOBAL COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE 10-11 (2007), available at
http://www.ncpa.org/ pdfs/st304.pdf See also Cortez, supra note 112, at 85-86.
372. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence in the Information
Age, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 81, 89 (1998).
373. See Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 220.
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particularly important "in an age of information overload."374
Although virtually every facet of cross-border care deserves more
searching examination, the quality of foreign care remains a major blind
spot. Public and private "regulators" should prioritize collecting and
publishing quality data, such as surgical success and failure rates that are
defined by standardized endpoints.3 75 High-performing hospitals could then
market themselves as centers of excellence for certain procedures-which
many already do based on unverified data-and low-performing hospitals
would have more incentive to improve their outcomes. 376 The movement
toward evidence-based medicine provides several models. For example,
states, insurers, and accreditors might require foreign providers to report
"never events"-a defined list of preventable adverse events that should
never occur.377 Publishing this information would be critical to invoking
the pressure points new governance supplies, such as public shaming. 378
But who should collect this information, and how? Insurers can gather
quality information from foreign providers as a condition of doing
business, though it is uncertain whether insurers would publish this
information without states requiring it.379 If states did require publication,
the states could aggregate and disseminate the information. 380
Alternatively, some of the networks discussed above could aggregate and
publish the data. For example, JCI could aggregate quality data from
hospitals and use it to calibrate its accreditation standards. Trade groups
like the MTA could do the same. State regulators could even use industry
data to generate state-sanctioned guidelines.381 Given the glut of
374. Id.
375. See Cortez, supra note 112, at 120, 125; Hervey & Trubek, supra note II, at 639.
376. Hervey & Trubek, supra note 11, at 639.
377. Blum, supra note 248, at 131. In fact, "Minnesota became the first of several states to require
that the list of 27 adverse events measures developed by the National Quality Forum (NQF), referred to
as 'never events,' be reported to the Minnesota Department of Health." Id.
378. Trubek, supra note 248, at 150-51, 163-64; Zaring, supra note 195, at 557 (noting how the
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has used press releases to announce its purpose and activities,
in a departure from more conventional notices and activities).
379. Disclosure by facilitators and providers in the cross-border market meets the spirit of
informed consent law, which is being used increasingly to address information asymmetries between
health care purchasers and providers, in part by requiring disclosure of performance and outcome data.
Hunter, supra note 16, at 21 & nn. 101-02.
380. Similarly, several states have pharmaceutical marketing reporting laws. Companies submit
information that the state then discloses to the public in aggregate form. See, e.g., Disclosures of
Marketing Expenditures for Prescription Drugs, Biological Products and Medical Devices, OFFICE OF
THE ATry GEN. OF VT., http://www.atg.state.vt.us/issues/pharmaceutical-manufacturer-payment-
disclosure. php (last visited May 10, 2011) (including a link to the "Previous Years Pharmaceutical
Public Data" as required by 18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 4631(a), 4632 (2010)).
381. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 266, at 308 (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency
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information here, the groups that do aggregate and distribute credible
information would wield significant influence over industry practices. 382
Generating reliable information is itself a goal, and new governance is
well suited to it.383 Using information gathering as a regulatory tool has
always been attractive to politicians and regulators looking for less
burdensome regulatory alternatives. 384  Not only should credible
information enable patients and insurers to make more informed decisions,
but it should also generate public goods like transparency that will allow us
to make better collective decisions about the quality of overseas care. 385 In
this vein, involving the many government and nonprofit organizations
focused on border health can balance the individualistic concerns of
patients, providers, and insurers.
5. The Government Backstop
As much as new governance suits the cross-border industry, this
proposal does not rely solely on voluntary cooperation and nonbinding
standards. Hard law supplies a useful starting point and backstop. State
laws can buttress private regulation and intervene when it fails. 38 6 The
government can play a number of roles here-legislator, funder, monitor,
sanctioner, orchestrator, and educator. 3 87  State regulators can also
contribute to private standards, enhancing the accountability of the entire
scheme and lending it the imprimatur of the state, even if nongovernment
parties are the primary actors.388 For example, a state law requiring JCI
accreditation for foreign hospitals would put an official stamp on an
otherwise nongovernmental process.
Government regulators frequently rely on new governance, for
example by setting performance standards that are implemented by
decentralized, local actors. 389 In the health industry, several state laws now
require drug and device companies to comply with voluntary industry
takes this approach under the Clean Water Act).
382. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 372, at 89 ("Editors, filters, interpreters, and cue-givers
become more in demand, and this is a source of power.").
383. Burris, Kempa & Shearing, supra note 248, at 32-33; Trubek, supra note 248, at 151.
384. Sage, supra note 245, at 508 ("The fact that information-based regulation is essentially off-
budget enhances its political attractiveness.").
385. Id. at 516-19.
386. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 544-45; Meidinger, supra note 274, at 528
("[S]upragovernmental regulatory programs are accountable to states in multiple ways.").
387. Trubek, supra note 248, at 160.
388. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 558.
389. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 348, at 430, 436-37.
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codes of conduct, transforming de facto requirements into de jure ones.390
Regulators have considered similar proposals in the cross-border
industry-proposed bills in West Virginia would have given state
employees an incentive to have surgeries overseas, but only at JCI-
accredited hospitals.391 Thus, private certification can serve as a proxy for
compliance with state law, 392 or states may adopt or endorse private
standards.
States should follow California's example, which demonstrates the
complementary roles for hard and soft law. California law requires cross-
border plans to review continuously "the quality of care" 393 and the
"performance of medical personnel," 394 among other things, and the
Department of Managed Health Care can revoke an insurer's license if it
fails to oversee the quality of care in its provider network.3 95 Before
California applied these laws, the unregulated cross-border insurance
market generally provided "cheap services" for "cheap costs."3 96 Hard law
legitimated this market.397 California law even legitimated cross-border
390. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119402 (West 2008) (incorporating the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA") Code on Interactions with Health
Care Professionals); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. Ill N, § 2 (2010) (requiring the Massachusetts Department
of Public Health to issue a code of conduct "no less restrictive" than the PhRMA Code and the
Advanced Medical Technology Association Code); NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570 (2009) (citing the
PhRMA Code as satisfying a drug manufacturer's new obligation to adopt a written code of conduct).
391. H.B. 2841, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2007); H.B. 4711, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
2006); H.B. 4359, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2006).
392. Meidinger, supra note 274, at 519. Indeed, if nongovernment certification programs interact
with state regulators, these standards can coalesce. Even courts may adopt privately generated
standards, for example, by embracing private standards as the standard of care in tort cases. Id. at 520.
States can combine reliance on voluntary standards with oversight of the organizations that promulgate
them, representing a form of metaregulation. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 566. Elsewhere, I
have suggested government oversight of JCI. Cortez, supra note 112, at 125-26. For more, see
Bronwen Morgan, Regulating the Regulators: Meta-Regulation as a Strategy for Reinventing
Government in Australia, I PUB. MGMT. 50 (1999) (discussing the structure of the Australian
metaregulatory regime and discussing the ability of metaregulation to create more efficient systems).
393. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.
394. Id.
395. Id. § 1351.2(a).
396. Maguire, supra note 179, at 49 (quoting Ernesto Dominguez Garcia, Subdirector Operativo
in Tijuana for Seguros Comercial America). See also Lenert & Cohen, supra note 207, at 21 ("[T]he
companies that were selling cross-border insurance products were not licensed, tracked, or accounted
for by a regulator in California, nor by any Mexican regulatory entity."). Although Texas law does not
permit cross-border plans under Texas Insurance Code § 1216.004, prior legislation would have relied
on Mexican laws and regulations to govern Mexican providers, and the Texas Department of Insurance
has contemplated conditioning cross-border insurance licensure in Texas on compliance with Mexican
regulatory requirements. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1216.004 (West 2010); Cohen & Lenert, supra note
192, at 81, 84, 86.
397. Having a controlled, regulated market can also be an asset internationally. For example, there
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ERISA plans that are largely subject to federal rather than state oversight-
the WGA lobbied California to require ERISA plans to obtain a state
Certificate of Compliance to give the WGA plan credibility among the
fraudulent or underfunded plans in the market.398 More recently, several
private groups in California, including labor unions and the hotel,
restaurant, and construction industries, have lobbied for regulation of cross-
border plans.3 99
Nevertheless, cross-border insurance can thrive even without hard law
or government regulation. For example, the WGA has had to regulate its
foreign provider network itself because, as a self-funded ERISA plan, it
cannot rely on state regulation and ERISA does not concern itself with
minimum coverage requirements or the quality of care.4 00 Thus, although I
recommend that states use hard law as a backstop, cross-border care might
be feasible without it.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE PROPOSAL
Cross-border insurance is not a panacea. It will not cover all those
who remain uninsured after health reform. Nor will it eliminate concerns
that health care in developing countries is of lower quality, or not regulated
adequately, or both. Moreover, because the proposal relies on new
governance, it is also susceptible to criticisms that it suffers from
democratic and accountability deficits. These limitations are real. And they
remind us that cross-border insurance is not the ideal solution for covering
those who remain uninsured after health reform. But given current political
realities, particularly regarding immigrants, this proposal is worth pursuing
even with its limitations.
A. HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET WILL PERSIST
Foreign providers cannot patch every hole in the U.S. health care
system. Cross-border insurance will not cover all twenty-three million
residents that will remain uninsured after health reform, something that
even the most ardent advocates for cross-border insurance recognize. 401
is a demand for U.S. capital markets not only because of the resources available in the United States,
but also in part because SEC regulation has been successful. See Macey, supra note 252, at 1362.
398. Shanahan, supra note 179, at 69, 71.
399. Lenert & Cohen, supra note 207, at 22; Maguire, supra note 179, at 49.
400. See Shanahan, supra note 179, at 67, 71-72. In fact, the WGA might serve as a useful
regulatory node, not only due to its foreign network, but also because it serves as an appointed agent of
several U.S. insurers, including Aetna and Health Net. See id at 68.
401. See Lenert & Shanahan, supra note 203, at 239.
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Low-cost cross-border insurance may still be too expensive for some.
The average annual cost of the cross-border plans in California for a family
of three is $4300,402 which may be unaffordable for many migrant workers
and other unauthorized immigrants. At some point, low-cost insurance
competes with out-of-pocket, fee-for-service care.403 And unauthorized
immigrants are often reluctant to enroll in health insurance plans "because
of fear of revealing their immigration status, lack of education, and lack of
information." 404 Insurers must educate consumers in the lowest-cost market
on the value of insurance. 405 Thus, states and nonprofit networks will be
important here, as they can provide unbiased information not tainted by a
financial interest to enroll customers.
Cross-border plans also are not practical for everyone. They may not
be practical for expensive chronic treatments, such as kidney dialysis or
treatment for mental illness. Moreover, proximity matters. Most patients
would prefer not to travel to Asia for surgery. And some patients simply
cannot, due to medical conditions or limited mobility or a host of other
reasons. Even plans that utilize providers in Mexico confront this reality-
cross-border plans in California have reported declining enrollment for
residents farther away from the Mexico border.406 In fact, California may
be unique geographically in that it enjoys a large population near the
border.407 Even states like Texas do not enjoy the same border population.
Cross-border insurance also further complicates the insurance market.
Uninsured patients would have to make difficult tradeoffs between public
plans (if eligible), private plans that utilize only domestic providers, and
cross-border plans that use foreign providers. Cross-border insurance adds
another layer of complexity: in addition to choosing between plans that
offer varying premiums, deductibles, and benefits, patients also would have
to consider whether they would be willing to leave the country for care, and
under what circumstances. Insurance products that encourage foreign care
will further complicate both purchasing and utilization decisions by
patients, which is a real concern. 408 Moreover, it is not clear whether
402. CMHI, supra note 185, at 4.
403. CROSS-BORDER HEALTH INSURANCE: OPTIONS FOR TEXAS, supra note 32, at xxiv.
404. Martinez, de la Mora & Spagnolo, supra note 212, at 218. See also Maguire, supra note 179,
at 58-59.
405. Lenert & Shanahan, supra note 203, at 249-50; Maguire, supra note 179, at 58-59; Savio,
supra note 179, at 41.
406. Maguire, supra note 179, at 57. See also Martinez, de la Mora & Spagnolo, supra note 212,
at 221.
407. Martinez, de la Mora & Spagnolo, supra note 212, at 221.
408. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 1552 (citing a New York state study showing that despite
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patients can or want to make these decisions.4 09 Thus, convincing patients
to enroll and educating them on the tradeoffs they are making may require
significant outreach.
Perhaps most importantly, some immigrants may be reluctant to leave
the United States for care if doing so would jeopardize pending
applications for legal residency or if they could not reenter. Unauthorized
immigrants, in particular, will need an avenue for legal reentry, which
probably requires comprehensive federal immigration reform-yet another
extraordinary hurdle.
Finally, cross-border insurance may exacerbate existing problems with
our domestic safety net. It will further fragment both the safety net and the
insurance market. Cross-border plans may make it even more difficult for
physicians to coordinate care, particularly when a patient receives primary
care in one country and specialty care in another. And cross-border
insurance may have the perverse effect of undermining future political
efforts to cover the remaining uninsured.
Again, these limitations are real. But they are not insurmountable, nor
do they mean that cross-border plans will not be a viable low-cost
alternative for a significant number of uninsured residents. For many, the
choice will be between cross-border insurance and no insurance at all.
Moreover, because the United States attracts low-income immigrants from
developing countries who cannot afford traditional insurance, we might use
innovations from these countries to offer affordable health insurance. For
example, insurers in some developing countries are experimenting with
private "microinsurance" that is proving to be a viable alternative to paying
out-of-pocket for care as needed.410 Several features of my proposal
parallel the practices used by microinsurance.
"heroic efforts to educate patients" on insurance plan choices, most still misunderstood the basic plans).
409. See, e.g., JOST, supra note 132, at 31, 90, 92-96 (recognizing the importance of freedom of
choice but pointing out limitations on such freedom, including insufficient information gathering,
manipulation of tastes and preferences, and irrational consumer behavior); Cortez, supra note 231, at 87
(discussing the prohibition of liability waivers and the issues surrounding liability standards in medical
tourism); Mark A. Hall & Carl. E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New
Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 649-51 (2008) (noting the effects of illness on a patient
when making choices as a consumer); Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can
Consumers Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, I1-13, 19-26 (2009) (discussing consumerism
and the availability of information to patients).
410. "Microinsurance" is "low-cost health insurance based on a community or cooperative
model." Dror et al., supra note 203, at 1788.
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B. REGULATORY AND NORM DIFFERENTIALS WILL PERSIST
This proposal relies on the ability of public regulators, private
insurers, and a host of other collaborators to convince foreign providers to
meet U.S. quality standards, largely without using the threat of formal legal
sanctions. Even if these efforts succeed, they will not completely eliminate
the discrepancies in how health care is practiced and regulated in
developing countries. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, legal differentials
will remain embedded-countries like India, Thailand, and Mexico have
legal systems that differ dramatically from ours. 411 Indeed, California was
originally motivated to regulate cross-border plans in part by the concern
that American citizens would have to rely on Mexico's legal system to
resolve complaints.412 Even geographically linked countries like the United
States and Mexico differ enough socially, politically, and legally that
cooperation faces inherent obstacles. 413 As Kinney notes, "Mexico has the
health care sector of a developing country," and "[t]he legal infrastructure
for each country's health sector is quite different." 414 Other countries in the
cross-border market are just as heterogeneous with the United States, and
new governance tends to be most effective when the parties are relatively
homogeneous. 415 Developing countries may resist perceived efforts to
regulate their hospitals and physicians from afar. In short, the countries that
supply and demand cross-border health care may not share common
histories, religions, or cultures, which tend to facilitate cooperation. 416
Note, however, that most destination countries are generally liberal
states that observe international law and norms.4 17 And although parties'
interests may diverge, most in the cross-border industry share the long-term
interest that cross-border care be safe and legitimate. It is not necessary for
destination countries to cater their legal and regulatory systems to U.S.
411. See generally Cortez, supra note 231 (discussing the legal recourse available to patients who
choose to travel to India, Thailand, Mexico, or Singapore for medical treatment).
412. Cal. Bill Analysis, S.B. 1658, Assemb. Floor, Reg. Sess., at 2 (1998); Lenert & Cohen, supra
note 207, at 23.
413. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 276-77 (1997).
414. Kinney, supra note 187, at 947-48.
415. Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 217-19 (noting that transatlantic networks are
generally easier to implement than north-south ones). Networks among wealthy, established liberal
democracies with strong commitments to the rule of law are naturally more robust than networks
comprised of more heterogeneous members. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 413, at 276-77, 335-36.
416. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 413, at 335.
417. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503, 509, 529 n.57 (1995) (defining "liberal states" as those with a representative government and a
market economy).
926 [Vol. 84:859
2011] EMBRACING THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF HEALTH CARE
standards; I simply call for foreign providers that do target U.S. patients to
observe emerging industry standards. We can never fully harmonize health
care or its regulation. But we can try to guide international standards to
protect U.S. patients. And new governance holds the best hope for
regulating cross-border care between countries with widely divergent legal
and regulatory regimes. 418 Moreover, softer regulation can be more suitable
in areas "where there is intense disagreement among decision-making
authorities."419 New governance is an appropriate response to legal
pluralism and viewpoint pluralism, as noted in other areas.420
Another potential criticism of this proposal is that it largely lacks the
legal power to compel and coerce foreign providers,421 which virtually
ensures that legal and norm differentials will persist. Thus, foreign
providers and ministries seeking to protect their domestic providers may
ignore or disregard nonbinding standards and norms when it suits them.
The very process of interaction, however, should encourage foreign
providers to internalize these nonbinding standards. 422 And even with
traditional regulation, "actual enforcement. . . is weak" and regulators do
not have the resources or wherewithal to enforce every requirement all of
the time.423 "Partial-industry regulation" can be better than nothing at all.424
Thus, more flexible noncoercive regulation may be the best approach for
the cross-border market, particularly if it is enforced by contractual
arrangements.
A more fundamental potential criticism of the proposal is that
economic integration between developed and developing countries is often
used as a lever "to force the legal and economic systems of stronger
countries, such as the U.S., onto weaker countries," 425 as a form of
418. See Hervey & Trubek, supra note 11, at 645; Lobel, supra note 248, at 379-81.
419. Lobel, supra note 248, at 394.
420. Id. at 424 (describing how new governance would address the need for "intergovernmental
coordination and continuous experimentation, learning and adjustment" within environmental
regulation).
421. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 266, at 2603, 2645-59 (describing how "transnational legal
process promotes the interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international legal norms,"
causing nations to obey international rules, despite the lack of enforcement of such rules). As Louis
Henkin famously noted "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost
all of their obligations almost all of the time." LOUis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND
FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omitted).
422. Koh, supra note 251, at 203-05.
423. Lobel, supra note 248, at 392.
424. lan Ayres & John Braithwaite, Partial-Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for
Consumer Protection, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 13, 14 (1992) ("[I]n some situations 'partial-industry'
regulation may be superior to all-or-nothing regulatory policies.").
425. Kinney, supra note 187, at 957 (citing Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind: The
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developed-country imperialism. 426  Regulatory export is not always
welcomed by its recipients. Thus, the quality standards that emerge should
ensure that developing countries have a voice in the process.427 Indeed,
cross-border health networks should effectively integrate developing
country regulatory expertise-as JCI claims to do with international
accreditation standards. 428 Nevertheless, on a fundamental level my
proposal would impose U.S.-inspired standards on foreign providers
mainly in developing countries. Thus, it is imperative that foreign providers
contribute to the standards. 429
C. DEMOCRATIC AND ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICITS WILL PERSIST
Because this proposal relies on alternative methods of regulation, it is
similarly susceptible to criticisms that it will regulate conduct without
being accountable to voters in any traditional way, a critique often framed
as a democratic or accountability deficit.43 0  Participation in new
governance schemes is rarely democratic in the traditional sense called for
by liberal democratic theory.431 Soft law guidelines and standards usually
are not reviewable by courts.432 And international collaborations of putative
experts are not subject to formal checks and balances.433 Their informality
and lack of public-mindedness can make them susceptible to capture,
allowing the industry to manipulate the network for its own ends, perhaps
by ratcheting down or diluting standards. 434  Indeed, particularly in
Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under the Guise of Economic Integration, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1321 (2005)).
426. These relationships may include parties with unequal bargaining power, which allows
wealthy advanced states to impose standards unilaterally on weaker and poorer states. Slaughter &
Zaring, supra note 267, at 221. They are also criticized as having a Western or liberal bias, and being
"imperialistic." Esty, supra note 248, at 1541.
427. Burris, Kempa & Shearing, supra note 248, at 28. See also Slaughter & Burke-White, supra
note 196, at 336 ("It should not be assumed that regulatory expertise flows only from developed to
developing countries.").
428. JCI, Regional Advisory Councils, supra note 339.
429. This approach may even be preferable because regulators in the United States will not be as
concerned about the effects policies may have on foreign jurisdictions. See Meidinger, supra note 274,
at 528 ("[Sltates have few institutional incentives to consider the effects of their policies on noncitizens
outside their boundaries.").
430. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 248, at 1507-08; Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 248, at
16; Zaring, supra note 195, at 597-600.
431. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 555-56.
432. Hervey & Trubek, supra note I1, at 640.
433. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 248, at 58.
434. Esty, supra note 248, at 1507; Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 267, at 221 ("[I]nformal
harmonization is subject to many of the familiar problems of public choice, such as capture and
unrepresentative agency action.").
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international industries, corporate power has "seize[d] an increasing
number of the levers of governability away from public authorities."as
Although the ideal of new governance is democratic experimentalism,
some forms may be closer to "managed tokenism."4 36 These types of
failures-capture and a lack of accountability-can be particularly
corrosive. 437
These criticisms are valid but can be overcome. First, decentralization
can mitigate against capture. A multiplicity of public and private
"regulators," some of whom have countervailing interests, should protect
against capture by the industry. 438 For example, the Texas bills that would
have legalized cross-border plans were defeated in large part by the Texas
Medical Association and other local providers over concerns that they
would lose market share to less expensive Mexican providers. 439 As such,
U.S. hospitals and physicians can serve as a powerful counterweight to the
cross-border industry, as demonstrated by the AMA's guidelines on
medical tourism. 440
Second, as Hunter argues, using insurance as a conduit for regulation
can help counter the "huge democracy deficit" created by our system of
employer-based health insurance that delegates important decisions to
private, corporate parties."' Cross-border insurance can be used as a form
of self-governance in the "pragmatic spirit of democratic
experimentalism."" 2 Insurers should thus engage their customers on
whether to offer cross-border options in insurance plans, which will invite
discourse between insurers and the insured.443 Indeed, soliciting broad
participation will come closer to the ideal enunciated by William Sage that
health policy should be driven by broader, more collective "regulatory"
435. Burris, Kempa & Shearing, supra note 248, at 19.
436. Meidinger, supra note 274, at 534.
437. Esty, supra note 248, at 1524-25.
438. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 553-54; Braithwaite, supra note 250, at 885.
439. See Cohen & Lenert, supra note 192, at 88. Proponents of cross-border care believe that the
Texas Medical Association ("TMA") "will always take a hard-line approach against cross-border care."
Id. The TMA argued that Texas physicians would rather care for uninsured patients for free than send
them to a Mexican health care system that they believe has few standards regarding access, quality, and
care. Id. at 89. Even in California, the medical community generally opposes cross-border insurance.
Lenert & Cohen, supra note 207, at 23.
440. AMA Guidelines, supra note 342.
441. Hunter, supra note 16, at 45-46, 60. In particular, Hunter argues that the Supreme Court's
ERISA preemption decisions have delegated decisionmaking responsibility to private insurers, creating
"a charter of corporate sovereignty." Id. at 60.
442. Id. at 46.
443. Id. at 49-51 (noting that such a process invites the parties to contemplate their moral and
social obligations).
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interests rather than individualized "relational" self-interest.44  Finally,
scholars have proposed countless ways to enhance public participation and
accountability with alternative forms of regulation.445 Perhaps the sole
missing ingredient here is the lack of activist patient groups with a stake in
cross-border care.446 But again, U.S. providers might serve as a proxy for
patient interests.
Another rebuttal is that when evaluating options for addressing cross-
border care, "the appropriate counterfactual is not hypothetical
representative democracy or 'ideal speech' deliberation, but the prevailing
regulatory setting. ""' Here, the appropriate counterfactual may be
traditional regulation (which again is not particularly feasible, given the
market's international dimensions), or more likely, no regulation at all.
Cross-border insurance can serve as a conduit for employing alternative
methods of regulation where regulation otherwise would not exist. Some
regulation, even if it is not comprehensive or perfect, is often better than no
regulation at all.448
A final political consequence relates to our health care system itself. If
we accept cross-border insurance as a solution for the residual uninsured, it
may temper calls for universal coverage or even lend political legitimacy to
arguments against it under the rationale that these populations can "still get
care." 449 Just as the "social mythology surrounding the safety net lends the
444. Sage, supra note 245, at 500-01 (arguing that health policy is too often driven by "relational
duties" in which legal obligations are structured with individual parties in mind, rather than "regulatory
duties" that serve broader, more abstract goals, casting the distinction as "[a]n obligation to further the
interest of a something rather than a someone").
445. For example, standard-setting organizations like JCI might consider stakeholder advisory
councils, notice and comment procedures, or other consultative procedures. See Abbott & Snidal, supra
note 248, at 554-55. And alternative mechanisms of creating accountability are often "backed by
pressures from markets and from peers, by financial controls, and by public reputational dynamics."
Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart supra note 248, at 58. Iterative, repeat dealings create reputational
incentives, which are perhaps even more powerful than the threat of sanctions. Koh, supra note 266, at
2601, 2639.
446. Activist groups can be an important force in "challenging the acceptability of existing
institutional arrangements and offering alternatives." Meidinger, supra note 274, at 516. They can also
publicize noncompliance. Id. at 525.
447. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 248, at 557 (footnote omitted).
448. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 424, at 14; Koh, supra note 266, at 2603 (noting that despite
well-known shortcomings with international rules, they are nonetheless obeyed).
449. Brown, supra note 86, at 326 (quoting a statement from George W. Bush while he was
president). Similar arguments have been made regarding our domestic safety net. Id. at 325. In fact,
President Bush also remarked "people have access to health care in America ... After all, you just go to
an emergency room." Dan Froomkin, Mock the Press, WASH. POST (July 11, 2007, 1:14 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/ 2 0 0 7 /07/11 /BL2007071101146.html.
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system an eerie stability,"450 so too might cross-border insurance and other
stopgap measures deflate calls for universal coverage. 4 5 ' Thus, while this
proposal may cover many uninsured in the short-term, it could undermine
longer-term efforts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Cross-border insurance is a relatively novel and surprisingly feasible
way to cover those who remain uninsured after health reform, particularly
immigrants who are not offered or cannot afford public or private
insurance. It appeals intuitively not only because our polity seems
unwilling to provide truly universal coverage or extend public coverage to
most immigrants, but also because foreign providers have already emerged
as a safety valve for U.S. patients, insurers, and even hospitals. At the same
time, using cross-border insurance as a stopgap to cover vulnerable
populations might also offend our basic intuition that people living in the
United States should be able to access affordable care here. In this vein, my
proposal is very much animated by the blunt reality that our health care and
immigration systems will not provide all care at all times to all people,
regardless of their immigration status or ability to pay. This Article accepts
these realities and proposes a way to embrace the new geography of health
care.
450. Brown, supra note 86, at 326. See also Annas, supra note 107, at 448.
451. E.g., Hall, supra note 13, at 10.
931
